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 Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. This essay is based on a lecture 
I gave as a “jurist in residence” at the Gould Law School of the University of Southern California 
on January 23, 2019. I wish to thank my talented clerks Lauren Greil and Miriam Becker-Cohen, 
and my talented intern, Ainsley Tucker, for their invaluable assistance in preparing this essay. The 
essay, reprinted here with the permission of The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process, first 
appeared as Kermit V. Lipez, Reflections on the Church/State Puzzle, 20 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 
7 (2019). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past five years, the Supreme Court has decided four important cases 
involving the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Town of Greece v. 
Galloway,1 Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer,2 Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission,3 and American Legion v. American Humanist Association.4 
By analyzing and reacting to these cases, I hope to offer a perspective on pieces of 
the church/state puzzle that will help judges and others think more critically about 
future developments in this consequential area of the law.5 
Masterpiece Cakeshop and Trinity Lutheran are primarily Free Exercise Clause 
cases. Town of Greece and American Legion are Establishment Clause cases. Taken 
together, these cases reflect a weakening of the Establishment Clause in favor of a 
stronger free exercise right—a trend that will likely increase the presence of majority 
religions in the public square, to the possible detriment of minority religions. As I 
explain, this trend is most notable in the continuing shift in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence away from the three-part test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman,6 with 
its focus on the present effects of statutes or government practices with religious 
implications, toward a “historically rooted practice” test. Unlike the Lemon test, the 
“historically rooted practice” test, as articulated in Town of Greece and invoked in 
American Legion, fails to account for the religious pluralism of today’s society. I 
therefore counsel caution in eliminating Lemon from our Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence. I also warn against conflating a measured separation of church and 
state in judicial decisions—still central to the neutrality principle of the Religion 
Clauses—with hostility to religion. 
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment are familiar: “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”7 These Clauses frame the debate about the proper relationship between the 
government and religion. Although the First Amendment explicitly limits the power 
of the federal government—”Congress shall make no law”—the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                     
1 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014). 
2 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017). 
3 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
4 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019). 
5 In approximately the last five years, the Supreme Court has also decided two important 
church/state cases under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 et seq. 
[hereinafter “RFRA”], see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014), and the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq., see Holt v. 
Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015). In a third case involving RFRA, Zubik v. Burwell, ___ U.S. ___, 136 
S. Ct. 1557 (2016), the Court avoided a ruling on the merits and vacated and remanded so that the 
courts of appeals could address the arguments made by the parties in response to the order for 
supplemental briefing. I do not discuss these cases. 
6 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania and Rhode Island 
statutes that provided state funding for non-public, non-secular schools violated the Establishment 
Clause because they created excessive entanglement of state and church. In reaching that 
conclusion, the Court adopted the three-part Lemon test, which requires that a statute or government 
practice (1) must have a “secular legislative purpose”; (2) must have a principal or primary effect 
that “neither advances nor inhibits religion”; and (3) must “not foster an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.” Id. at 612–13 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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ruled in a pair of cases in the 1940s, Cantwell v. Connecticut8 and Everson v. Board 
of Education,9 that those limits also apply to state governments through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Given the generality of the Religion Clauses, there is no consensus on the 
breadth of their application. But the ongoing debate reflects two competing visions 
on the Supreme Court about the proper relationship between the government and 
religion under our Constitution: the “accommodation vision” and the “separation 
vision.”10 Painting in broad strokes, the accommodation vision requires government 
to make ample room for religion in public life, or, to use a favorite phrase of the 
accommodation advocates, in the public square. This vision favors a narrow 
application of the Establishment Clause and an expansive application of the Free 
Exercise Clause. The separation vision requires government to keep a safe distance 
from religion. It is wary of religion’s presence in the public square, favoring an 
expansive application of the Establishment Clause and a narrow application of the 
Free Exercise Clause. The separate opinions of the justices in Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
Trinity Lutheran, Town of Greece, and American Legion reflect these competing 
visions. 
II. MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP: THE FIGHT FOR RELIGIOUS EXCEPTIONS 
TO PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS 
Some accommodationists seek to expand the Free Exercise Clause by requiring 
religious exceptions to laws that prohibit discrimination in places of public 
accommodation. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Supreme Court considered the 
demand of a baker for a religious exemption from a law prohibiting discrimination 
against gay couples. 
A. Precedent: Employment Division v. Smith 
In a precedent central to Masterpiece Cakeshop, Employment Division v. 
Smith,11 the Court had to decide if a state, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, 
could deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs for violating 
state criminal laws by using peyote in their religious worship.12 Prior to Smith, the 
                                                                                                     
8 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause). 
9 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Establishment Clause). Justice Thomas rejects the incorporation of the 
Establishment Clause against the states, as he made clear in his concurrence in American Legion. 
See infra p. 352. 
10 Compare, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 NW. U. L. 
REV. 146, 147 (1987) (describing the separationist vision), with, e.g., William J. Cornelius, Church 
and State—The Mandate of the Establishment Clause: Wall of Separation or Benign Neutrality? 16 
ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 13–14 (1984) (describing the accommodationist vision); see also Carolyn A. 
Deverich, Establishment Clause Jurisprudence and the Free Exercise Dilemma: A Structural 
Unitary-Accommodationist Argument for the Constitutionality of God in the Public Square, 2006 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 211, 262 (2006) (critiquing the separationist view and advocating for an 
accommodation approach). 
11 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
12 Id. at 890. 
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Court had used the balancing test of Sherbert v. Verner13 to evaluate the kind of free 
exercise claim raised in Smith. Under that test, “governmental actions that 
substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest.”14 To the surprise and dismay of many scholars and advocates 
of the free exercise rights of minorities,15 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, 
abandoned the Sherbert balancing test in favor of a sweeping rule to justify the denial 
of unemployment benefits: 
[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply 
with a “valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law 
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”16 
Justice Scalia insisted that this rule was not new.17 The only precedent to the 
contrary, he said, involved “not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise 
Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of 
speech and of the press.”18 Smith was not such a hybrid case. He also said that a 
ruling in Smith’s favor under the Sherbert test “would open the prospect of 
constitutionally required religious exceptions from civic obligations of almost every 
conceivable kind,”19 and would require judges to “weigh the social importance of all 
laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs,”20 an exercise better left to the 
legislature in a democratic society. In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor, who 
                                                                                                     
13 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that a state may not apply the eligibility provisions for 
unemployment compensation in a way that requires workers of some faiths to abandon their 
religious convictions). 
14 Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402–03). 
15 See The Smith Decision: The Court Returns to the Belief-Action Distinction, PEW RESEARCH CTR.: 
RELIGION & PUB. LIFE (Oct. 24, 2007), https://www.pewforum.org/2007/10/24/a-delicate-balance/ 
(describing “significant political protest from religious organizations and civil liberties groups”); 
Michael McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1990) (referring 
to “over a hundred constitutional law scholars” who joined with religious and civil liberties groups 
in filing a petition for rehearing); cf. Smith, 494 U.S. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (lamenting 
the impact that Smith would have on minority religious groups and cautioning that courts should 
not “turn a blind eye to the severe impact of a State’s restrictions on the adherents of a minority 
religion” (citation omitted)). 
16 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. 
17 Despite Justice Scalia’s insistence that the Smith test was not new law, the Court had routinely 
applied Sherbert’s strict scrutiny to laws that inhibited the free exercise of religion prior to Smith. 
See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (striking down denial of 
unemployment benefits to Seventh-day Adventist fired for refusing to work on Saturday, the sect’s 
Sabbath); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (finding that compelling government interest 
in maintaining national tax system outweighed claim that payment of social security taxes offends 
religious belief); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (striking down denial of 
unemployment benefits for Jehovah’s Witness whose religious beliefs prevented him from 
manufacturing weapons for war); see also McConnell, supra note 15, at 1111 (characterizing the 
“theoretical argument” in Smith as “contrary to the deep logic of the First Amendment”); but see 
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (declining to require federal 
government to provide a compelling justification for road construction and timber harvesting in a 
Native American religious site because the actions were neither coercive nor a direct prohibition of 
religious practice). 
18 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citations omitted). 
19 Id. at 888. 
20 Id. at 890. 
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would have ruled for Oregon on the basis of the Sherbert balancing test, lamented its 
abandonment: “The compelling interest test [of Sherbert] reflects the First 
Amendment’s mandate of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible 
in a pluralistic society.”21  
Justice O’Connor’s critique became a rallying cry for critics of the Smith 
decision, who saw its non-accommodation approach to claims for religious 
exemptions from general laws as a threat to religious freedom and diversity.22 In 
1993, by overwhelming majorities in both Houses, Congress passed the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act to restore the applicability of the Sherbert balancing test to 
all federal and state laws.23 In a 1997 decision, City of Boerne v. Flores,24 the 
Supreme Court limited the applicability of the Act to federal law, concluding that 
Congress did not have the power pursuant to the enforcement provision of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to apply that law to the states.25 As a result, critics of the 
Smith decision have been hoping for years to find a case that would prompt the 
Supreme Court to overturn Smith and return to the Sherbert balancing test for free 
exercise challenges to state laws of general applicability, such as anti-discrimination 
laws. 
B. Masterpiece Cakeshop’s Sidestep 
Masterpiece Cakeshop had the potential to be that case. In 2012, a same-sex 
couple visited the Masterpiece Cakeshop, a bakery in Colorado, to order a wedding 
cake.26 The bakery’s owner, Jack Phillips, told the couple that he would not create 
such a cake because of his religious opposition to same-sex marriage. They filed a 
complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission claiming a violation of 
Colorado’s anti-discrimination law, which prohibited a place of public 
accommodation from refusing to provide goods or services on the basis of certain 
protected characteristics, including sexual orientation.27 The parties agreed that the 
bakery was a place of public accommodation, and that Phillips’s refusal to sell the 
couple a wedding cake violated Colorado’s anti-discrimination law.28  
Phillips argued that applying the anti-discrimination law to his refusal violated 
                                                                                                     
21 Id. at 903 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
22 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 15, at 1136 (“In a world in which some beliefs are more 
prominent than others, the political branches will inevitably be selectively sensitive toward religious 
injuries. Laws that impinge upon the religious practices of larger or more prominent faiths will be 
noticed and remedied. When the laws impinge upon the practice of smaller groups, legislators will 
not even notice, and may not care even if they do notice.”). 
23 See supra note 5. 
24 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
25 See id. at 536 (finding that Congress exceeded its power under the Constitution and that RFRA, 
as applied to the states, violated principles “necessary to maintain separation of powers and the 
federal balance”). Since the Court’s announcement of RFRA’s inapplicability to the states, twenty-
one states have passed their own Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, known as state RFRAs. See 
generally, e.g., State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES 
(May 4, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx 
(showing state RFRAs as of 2015). 
26 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723. 
27 Id. at 1725 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24–34–601(2)(a) (2017)). 
28 Id. at 1726. 
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his First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion and freedom of speech 
because requiring him either to bake the cake or face civil fines impermissibly forced 
him both to participate in an event (a same-sex wedding) prohibited by his religion 
and express a viewpoint that he abhorred. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission 
rejected those claims, and so did the Colorado courts.29 The United States Supreme 
Court then agreed to hear the case. 
This case was appropriately portrayed as a big deal. Twenty-one states and the 
District of Columbia have laws prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations 
on the basis of sexual orientation,30 and the Supreme Court had never recognized a 
religious exception to anti-discrimination laws. Indeed, in the 1968 case of Newman 
v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,31 the owner of a South Carolina barbecue chain 
claimed that a federal public accommodations law requiring him to serve blacks 
infringed on his freedom of religion because of his religious objections to integration. 
The Supreme Court rejected that claim as “patently frivolous.”32 And then there was 
Justice Scalia’s pronouncement in Smith that the Free Exercise Clause does not 
permit an individual to disobey a law of general applicability, like Colorado’s anti-
discrimination law, on religious grounds. If the Supreme Court recognized the 
religious exception claim of the Masterpiece baker, it would have to overrule Smith 
or somehow find it inapplicable. Going forward, any such decision would have 
enormous implications for the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws throughout 
the country. 
To the relief of many, the Supreme Court avoided these momentous issues. 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the seven-member majority, ruled in favor of the baker 
because he found that Colorado’s anti-discrimination law had not been neutrally 
applied to baker Phillips.33 Some statements made by the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission showed “clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious 
beliefs that motivated [the baker’s] objection.”34 Justice Kennedy also saw hostility 
in the Commission’s “difference in treatment” of the Masterpiece baker’s case from 
the cases of three other bakers who refused on the basis of conscience to bake cakes 
with images conveying disapproval of same-sex marriage.35 The Commission found 
that those bakers had not violated the public accommodations law. In Justice 
Kennedy’s view, that differential treatment justified Phillips’s concern that “the 
State’s practice was to disfavor the religious basis of his objection.”36 
                                                                                                     
29 See Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 283 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015), cert. denied 
sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 14CA1351, 2016 WL 
1645027 (Colo. Apr. 26, 2016). 
30 See Map of States with Non-Discrimination Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (Sept. 18, 
2019), http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_laws. Guam and Puerto Rico 
also have such laws. See id. 
31 390 U.S. 400 (1968). The law at issue was the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. at 400. 
32 Id. at 402 n.5. 
33 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724 (pointing out that “whatever the outcome of some 
future controversy involving facts similar to these, the Commission’s actions here violated the Free 
Exercise Clause; and its order must be set aside”). 
34 Id. at 1729. 
35 Id. at 1730. 
36 Id. at 1731. In the cases of concern to Justice Kennedy, there were three complaints from an 
individual who had approached bakers asking them to bake wedding cakes with explicit messages, 
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Although the Court declined to decide whether a business operator like Phillips 
is exempted from public accommodations laws because of his religious beliefs, 
several of the Justices hinted at their views. In the first line of a concurrence, Justice 
Gorsuch, joined by Justice Alito, cited Smith for its holding that “a neutral and 
generally applicable law will usually survive a constitutional free exercise 
challenge.”37 He then pointedly observed that “Smith remains controversial in many 
quarters.”38 Still, he agreed with Justice Kennedy that the Colorado Commission had 
violated Smith’s neutrality principle because it found the religious beliefs of the 
Masterpiece baker “offensive.”39 
In another concurring opinion, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, 
agreed with Justice Kennedy’s “hostility to . . . religion” rationale but also expressed 
approval of the baker’s free speech claim.40 Justice Thomas saw the baker as an artist 
who expressed himself through his cakes. The decision of the Colorado Commission 
thus compelled the baker to convey a message that he rejected. Justice Thomas 
apparently viewed the baker’s claim as the kind of hybrid described by Justice Scalia 
in Smith—a claim that implicates the “Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other 
constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press”—to which 
Smith’s rule does not apply.41 
Taken together, the Gorsuch and Thomas concurrences indicate unmistakable 
hostility to Smith. One way or another, by overturning Smith or writing around it, 
Justices Gorsuch and Thomas seem determined to create a religious-belief exception 
to public accommodations laws when they next have an opportunity to do so, if they 
                                                                                                     
based on the Bible, condemning same-sex marriage. See id. at 1730–31. The bakers refused to bake 
those cakes. Id. When the individual seeking those cakes filed complaints with the Commission, it 
concluded that the bakers acted lawfully in refusing service because they were legitimately 
concerned that the messages on the cakes, which they deemed to be hateful, would be attributed to 
them, and because “each bakery was willing to sell other products, including those depicting 
Christian themes, to the prospective customers.” Id. at 1730. As Justice Kennedy saw it, when 
Phillips made his compelled speech argument—that an implicit pro-gay marriage message on the 
wedding cake would be attributed to him—or when he insisted that he would sell any of his other 
products to gay or lesbian customers, the Commission ignored those arguments or dismissed them 
as irrelevant. Id. Hence, in Justice Kennedy’s view, the Commission showed hostility to the 
religious basis of Phillips’s objection. 
  In dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted a crucial difference between Phillips’s refusal to bake a 
wedding cake for the same-sex couple and the refusal of the other bakers to bake wedding cakes 
with messages condemning same-sex marriage: “Phillips declined to make a cake he found 
offensive where the offensiveness of the product was determined solely by the identity of the 
customer requesting it,” a clear violation of Colorado’s public accommodations law. “The three 
other bakers declined to make cakes where their objection to the product was due to the demeaning 
message the requested product would literally display.” Id. at 1750–51 (Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., 
dissenting). 
37 Id. at 1734 (Gorsuch & Alito, JJ., concurring). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 1740 (Thomas & Gorsuch, JJ., concurring) (asserting that the Colorado court’s “reasoning 
flouts bedrock principles of our free-speech jurisprudence and would justify virtually any law that 
compels individuals to speak,” and that “[i]t should not pass without comment”). 
41 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
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can persuade their colleagues.42 
Recently, however, the Court passed on an opportunity to do just that.43 Two 
bakers from Oregon, the Kleins, filed a petition for certiorari challenging a finding 
that they violated Oregon’s anti-discrimination law by refusing to bake a wedding 
cake for a same-sex couple.44 The Kleins asked the Court to overturn Smith and find 
that Oregon’s anti-discrimination law violated their free exercise rights.45 Instead, 
the Court simply granted the certiorari petition, vacated the decision of the Oregon 
Court of Appeals, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Masterpiece 
Cakeshop.46 The import of such a GVR order is always uncertain. In Klein, it could 
just mean avoidance of a difficult issue that the Court did not want to revisit so 
soon.47 However, there was evidence in the record that one of the Oregon 
commissioners participating in the administrative decision had made public 
statements arguably hostile to the legal position of the Kleins. Hence, the 
Masterpiece Cakeshop concern with hostility to religion by the state agency 
enforcing the public accommodations law might have been in play.48 
                                                                                                     
42 There is further evidence that four Justices are determined to undo Smith. Justice Alito recently 
filed a statement concurring in the denial of a certiorari petition with free exercise implications 
because unresolved factual questions in the case made it “difficult if not impossible” to decide the 
issues raised in the petition. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 634, 635 
(2019) (denying certiorari) (Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch & Kavanaugh, JJ., concurring) (concerning 
whether a public-school athletic coach has a First Amendment right to pray in the presence of his 
students). At the end of his statement, Justice Alito noted that “the Court drastically cut back on the 
protection provided by the free exercise clause” in Smith. Id. at 637. He then added that the Court 
had not been asked to “revisit” Smith in this particular case—an invitation for future such petitions. 
Id. 
43 See, e.g., Valerie Brannon, Supreme Court Vacates Another Opinion Applying Antidiscrimination 
Laws to Religious Objectors 1, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.—LEGAL SIDEBAR 10311 (June 19, 2019), 
available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10311.pdf. 
44 Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051 (Or. Ct. App. 2017), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated, ___ U. S. ___, 2019 WL 2493912 (Mem). 
45 See id. at 1059. 
46 Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., ___ U.S. ___, No. 18-547, 2019 WL 2493912 (Mem), at 
*1 (U.S. June 17, 2019). “GVR” stands for certiorari granted, lower court decision vacated, and 
case remanded. A GVR order indicates that the lower court should reconsider the case in light of 
new legal doctrine or cases decided after the lower court decision but before the Court grants a writ 
of certiorari. GVRs are sometimes construed as “a subtle (or not so subtle) hint that the court below 
might wish to try again, else the Supreme Court might be roused to actually reverse.” Aaron-Andrew 
P. Bruhl, The Supreme Court’s Controversial GVRs—and an Alternative, 107 MICH. L. REV. 711, 
715 (2009). 
47 See Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, The Supreme Court Is Showing an Instinct for Self-Preservation, 
at Least Until Next Year’s Election, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/opinion/supreme-court-abortion-census.html/. 
48 The standard for inquiry articulated by the Oregon Court of Appeals in Klein differed from the 
Court’s inquiry in Masterpiece Cakeshop, which presented a zero-tolerance mentality. Even “subtle 
departures” from neutrality can poison the well under Masterpiece Cakeshop, whereas Klein 
required the decisionmaker to have prejudged the issue so extensively “as to be incapable of 
determining its merits on the basis of the evidence and arguments presented.” Klein, 410 P.3d at 
1078 (citation omitted). 
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C. The Portent of Masterpiece Cakeshop 
I am dismayed by the prospect that the Supreme Court might create a religious 
exception to anti-discrimination laws.49 The warning shot about Smith from Justices 
Gorsuch and Alito in Justice Gorsuch’s Masterpiece Cakeshop concurrence signals 
an attempt to overrule Smith and return to the Sherbert balancing test for state laws 
affecting religious practice.50 If that happened, the justices would confront two issues 
in a case like Masterpiece Cakeshop. In a place of public accommodation, is a law 
that compels the owner to provide goods or services to same-sex couples, despite the 
owner’s religious objections to same-sex marriage, a substantial burden on the free 
exercise of religion? If so, does a compelling government interest justify that burden? 
In my view, the answer to the substantial burden question is no; the answer to the 
compelling interest question is yes. 
If, like the baker, you believed that same-sex marriage was religiously offensive 
and any degree of participation in same-sex marriage was wrong, what freedom 
would you have to express or practice that belief? Obviously, you could express that 
belief at home to anyone within earshot. You could stand in your town square and 
loudly proclaim your hostility to same-sex marriage. You could pray openly against 
same-sex marriage in a place of worship or anywhere you pray, and exercise your 
belief by attending a house of worship where such ceremonies are prohibited. In 
short, in our free society, with its robust protections for freedom of worship and 
freedom of speech, you have many opportunities to express your objections to same-
sex marriage and practice your belief. 
Nevertheless, if you decided to open a business offering goods and services to 
the public, you would no longer be praying or speaking in the privacy of your home 
or the sanctity of a place of worship. Instead, you would be participating in a 
marketplace, licensed and regulated by the government in many ways to protect the 
health and safety of the public. When you choose to go into business, you should 
know that your business is governed by anti-discrimination laws, like Colorado’s 
public accommodations statute forbidding the denial of goods and services to 
potential customers because of their sexual orientation. Or, as the price of doing 
business, you should know that the state, pursuant to its police power, might later 
oblige you to make a sale that you would find religiously offensive. 
Does this obligation substantially burden your religious freedom, the first 
showing required by the Sherbert balancing test, even if you are free to express your 
opposition to same-sex marriage at home, in public, or in your place of worship, and 
even if you chose to enter a business governed by anti-discrimination laws? Those 
                                                                                                     
49 The Court will soon have another opportunity to do so in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia.  In 
February 2020, the Court granted certiorari to address whether Philadelphia violated the free 
exercise rights of a religious agency by excluding it from the city’s foster care system because it 
refused to consider same-sex couples for foster-care placements. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 
140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (mem.); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, No. 
19-123 (Jul 22, 2019); see also Mark Rienzi, Symposium: The Calm Before the Storm for Religious-
Liberty Cases? SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 26, 2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/07/symposium-
the-calm-before-the-storm-for-religious-liberty-cases/ (noting that the Supreme Court could “revisit 
or narrow Smith” if it granted certiorari in Fulton). 
50 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1734 (Gorsuch & Alito, JJ., concurring); id. at 1740 
(Thomas & Gorsuch, JJ., concurring). 
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who supported the baker in the Masterpiece Cakeshop case answered that question 
with a resounding “yes”—your free exercise of religion is substantially burdened in 
exactly those circumstances. Indeed, Phillips’s Supreme Court brief took the position 
that the First Amendment promises him “and all likeminded believers[] freedom to 
live out their religious identity in the public square.”51 Former Attorney General 
Sessions similarly defended the free exercise of religion in the public square: 
Americans do not give up their freedom of religion by participating in the 
marketplace, partaking of the public square, or interacting with government; . . . free 
exercise of religion includes the right to act or abstain from action in accordance 
with one’s religious beliefs.52 
Clearly, when Phillips’s counsel and former Attorney General Sessions refer to 
the “public square,” they refer to something more than the literal public squares of 
this country, i.e., those many places where individuals and government interact, 
including schools, legislative halls, businesses, government offices, and government 
programs. According to the accommodation vision, the government abridges the free 
exercise of religion to the extent that it excludes religion from these places or 
precludes religious exceptions to general laws that affect religious practices or 
beliefs. Hence, according to this expansive version of the accommodation vision, 
telling baker Phillips that, as the price of doing business, he must bake a cake for a 
same-sex wedding, contrary to his religious belief, is tantamount to telling him that 
he cannot pray as he wishes in his place of worship. And to avoid that denial of his 
religious preference, the courts must accommodate Phillips’s free exercise right by 
protecting him from the application of an anti-discrimination law. 
This argument cannot survive the Sherbert balancing analysis.53 Under that 
framework, the Masterpiece baker must show that his religious exercise was 
substantially burdened by the requirement that he create the wedding cake. Several 
factors weigh against him. First, he was engaged in a business that he freely entered, 
knowing that the state regulated that business for the wellbeing of his customers. 
Second, he chose to bake wedding cakes as part of the business. Nobody compelled 
Phillips to make that choice, and he could change his business to make cakes for 
special events other than weddings. 54 Third, his characterization of his activity failed 
to establish that baking a cake for a wedding constitutes substantial participation in 
the event. Phillips did not claim that the wedding cake had, for example, the 
sacramental significance of bread and wine in a Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox 
Mass, such that cake-baking itself was a form of religious worship or practice. Given 
his choices prior to the same-sex couple’s cake request, his peripheral involvement, 
                                                                                                     
51 Brief for Petitioners at *16, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. 
Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 3913762 [hereinafter Masterpiece Petitioner’s Brief]. 
52 See Sarah Posner, The Christian Legal Army Behind Masterpiece Cakeshop, NATION (Nov. 28, 
2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-christian-legal-army-behind-masterpiece-cakeshop/. 
53 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. 
54 This is not a case like Sherbert, in which an individual was forced to choose between forsaking 
her religious beliefs or being ineligible for a government benefit. See id. (finding a substantial 
burden where law required petitioner “to choose between following the precepts of her religion and 
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to 
accept work, on the other hand”). 
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if any, in the wedding ceremony that he opposed, and his freedom to express 
opposition to same-sex marriage in other settings, the baker’s substantial-burden 
claim ignores the factors that minimize that burden. 
Moreover, even if one concluded that the law imposed a substantial burden on 
Phillips’s religious belief, this burden was justified by a compelling government 
interest—avoiding the indignity imposed on same-sex couples exercising their right 
to marry by denying them a public service available to others.55 Indeed, avoiding 
harm to others is an important consideration in the free exercise analysis.56 That 
consideration should doom any claim for a religious exception to anti-discrimination 
laws in the public square. 
III. TRINITY LUTHERAN: THE ASCENDENCY OF THE FREE EXERCISE 
CLAUSE OVER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
A. Accommodation for Religious Institutions 
In Trinity Lutheran, a different kind of Free Exercise case with Establishment 
Clause implications, the Court had to decide if the exclusion of a religious 
organization from participation in a public program on separationist grounds violated 
the free exercise rights of the organization. Missouri’s Department of Natural 
Resources offered grants to public and private schools, non-profit daycare centers, 
and other non-profit organizations to help them purchase rubber playground surfaces 
made from recycled tires. When the Trinity Lutheran Church applied for such a grant 
for its pre-school and daycare learning center, the Department denied the grant 
because the Missouri Constitution has a provision, justified on Establishment Clause 
grounds, stating that “no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly 
or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion.”57 
                                                                                                     
55 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1746 (describing the interests asserted by the state of 
Colorado as avoiding the “denigrat[ion] [of] the dignity of same-sex couples [and] assert[ion] [of] 
their inferiority” (quoting Brief for Respondents, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights 
Comm’n, at *39, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4838415 (quoting J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127, 142 (1994) and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241, 292 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring)). 
56 See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Exemptions, Third Party Harms, and the Establishment 
Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1375, 1476 (2016) (asserting that “[t]he general principle . . . that 
burdens on third parties matter . . . is well established”); Christopher C. Lund, Exploring Free 
Exercise Doctrine: Equal Liberty and Religious Exemptions, 77 TENN. L. REV. 351, 371 (2010) 
(referring to commentators who “see RFRA as deeply problematic because they believe it gives far 
too much power to religious claimants to avoid their legal obligations,” thus giving religious people 
both “a presumptive right to disobey the law” and “undue preference over their nonreligious 
counterparts”); see also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22–23 (3d ed. 1864) (discussing the harm 
principle). 
57 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2017–18 (quoting MO. CONST. art. I, § 7). Called Blaine 
Amendments after Congressman James Blaine of Maine, who tried unsuccessfully in 1875 to add 
language of this type to the First Amendment, such provisions are still found in the constitutions of 
thirty-eight states. See, e.g., Mike McShane, Does a Justice Kavanaugh Mean that Blaine 
Amendments are History? FORBES (July 10, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikemcshane/2018/07/10/does-a-justice-kavanaugh-mean-that-
blaine-amendments-are-history/#ed0c576e743a; Charlie Melcombe & Stanley Carlson-Thies, 
Supreme Court Upholds Equal Treatment for Faith-Based Organizations to Access Public Funding, 
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Writing for a seven-member majority, Chief Justice Roberts noted the 
agreement of the parties that the Establishment Clause does not prevent Missouri 
from including Trinity Lutheran in the playground program. As he put it, however, 
that agreement “[d]oes not . . . answer the question under the Free Exercise Clause, 
because we have recognized that there is ‘play in the joints’ between what the 
Establishment Clause permits and the Free Exercise Clause compels.”58 
Referring to Smith and its progeny, the Chief Justice wrote that 
in recent years, when this Court has rejected free exercise challenges, the laws in 
question have been neutral and generally applicable without regard to religion. We 
have been careful to distinguish such laws from those that single out the religious 
for disfavored treatment.59 
Missouri had engaged in such disfavored treatment because its categorical exclusion 
of religious institutions from a program otherwise open to public and private schools 
meant that these institutions had to “renounce [their] religious character” to 
participate.60 Thus, the program “impos[ed] a penalty on the free exercise of 
religion.”61 
Given that the Missouri law was not a neutral law of general applicability, the 
Court evaluated it under the “strictest scrutiny,”62 noting that it could “be justified 
only by a state interest of the highest order.”63 The state defended the law with its 
                                                                                                     
INST’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ALLIANCE (Aug. 10, 2017), http://www.irfalliance.org/supreme-court-
upholds-equal-treatment-for-faith-based-organizations-to-access-public-funding/. In origin, Blaine 
Amendments were designed to block public funding for Catholic schools. McShane, supra this note; 
Melcombe & Carlson-Thies, supra this note. 
58 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2019. The phrase used by the Chief Justice, “play in the joints,” 
appears often in cases dealing with the tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause. However, it does not always refer to the tension “between what the Establishment 
Clause permits and the Free Exercise Clause compels.” For example, in the case in which the phrase 
was first used, Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), it described the space between what the 
Establishment Clause prohibits and the Free Exercise Clause prohibits: “[W]e will not tolerate either 
governmentally established religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of those 
expressly proscribed governmental acts, there is room for play in the joints productive of a 
benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without 
interference.” Id. at 669 (emphasis added). Justice Ginsburg has explained the phrase differently: 
“This Court has long recognized that the government may . . . accommodate religious practices . . . 
without violating the Establishment Clause.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005) (citing 
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987), and noting that Locke v. Davey, 
540 U.S. 712 (2004) acknowledges the “‘play in the joints between’ the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses, allowing the government to accommodate religion beyond free exercise 
requirements, without offense to the Establishment Clause”). And there is this version in Locke 
itself: “There are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the 
Free Exercise Clause,” Locke, 540 U.S. at 719 (finding a state statute prohibiting state aid to 
secondary students pursuing theology constitutional under the First Amendment), a meaning 
contrary to the one invoked by the Chief Justice. In short, “play in the joints” is a slippery phrase 
with no settled meaning. 
59 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct at 2020. 
60 Id. at 2024. 
61 Id. at 2019. 
62 Id. at 2022 (citing Sherbert). 
63 Id. at 2019 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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desire to “skate[] as far as possible from religious establishment concerns.”64 But 
Chief Justice Roberts was not impressed: “In the face of the clear infringement on 
free exercise before us, that interest cannot qualify as compelling.”65 The Court held 
that Missouri could not exclude Trinity Lutheran from the playground-grant 
program. 
In dissent, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, rejected the 
majority’s premise that Trinity Lutheran was primarily a free exercise case. Indeed, 
she chided the majority for mentioning the Establishment Clause only to note the 
parties’ agreement that inclusion of the church in the program would not violate the 
Establishment Clause. Constitutional questions, she said, “are decided by this Court, 
not the parties’ concessions.”66 
For Justice Sotomayor, the key question in the case was whether the public funds 
at issue subsidized religion—”the touchstone,” as she saw it, “of establishment 
jurisprudence.”67 Justice Sotomayor answered that question by rejecting the notion 
that the playground surfaces of Trinity Lutheran’s learning center are somehow 
separate from the religious beliefs and worship of the church. She did not see how 
those playground surfaces could be confined to “secular use any more than lumber 
used to frame the church’s walls, glass stained and used to form its windows, or nails 
used to build its altar.”68 In her view, whenever “funds flow directly from the public 
treasury to a house of worship,”69 the government is directly funding religious 
exercise in violation of the Establishment Clause. Missouri avoided that violation by 
excluding churches from participation in the playground-grant program, and Justice 
Sotomayor concluded that it should not be ordered to do otherwise.70 Indeed, as she 
saw it, Missouri was prohibited by the Establishment Clause from doing what Chief 
Justice Roberts said the Free Exercise Clause required it to do. 
B. How Much Accommodation? 
The accommodation rationale of Trinity Lutheran, focusing on a government 
grant program available to public and private organizations seeking to improve their 
playground surfaces, evoked a hard question about the consequences of the 
separation vision of the Establishment Clause. If religiously affiliated organizations 
provide important services, such as education, daycare, nutrition, or home health 
care, what purpose is served by denying public support for these programs other than 
preserving a strict separation between church and state? According to Justice 
Sotomayor, “what purpose” is the wrong question: the use of public funds to 
subsidize the ostensibly non-religious activities of a church or religiously affiliated 
organization inescapably subsidizes its religious activities, no matter how far 
                                                                                                     
64 Id. at 2024. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 2028 (Sotomayor & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
67 Id. at 2030. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 2028–29. 
70 Id. at 2040 (“A State’s decision not to fund houses of worship does not disfavor religion; rather, 
it represents a valid choice to remain secular in the face of serious establishment and free exercise 
concerns.”). 
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removed those non-religious activities are from the core of religious belief and 
worship.71 For the adherents of this strict separation vision, keeping religion out of 
the public square, even in the form of government grant programs, is faithful to the 
Establishment Clause’s intent to keep government and religion as separate as 
possible. In their view, history is replete with tragic examples of the volatile mix of 
government and religion. 
However, given the decisions of Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan to join the 
opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in Trinity Lutheran,72 the strict separation vision is 
now a distinctly minority vision on the Court. Moreover, the most relevant history 
does not support the strict separation vision articulated by Justice Sotomayor. As 
Judge McConnell, a prolific writer on church/state issues, puts it,  
[e]xponents of strict separation are embarrassed by the many breaches in the wall of 
separation countenanced by those who adopted the First Amendment: the 
appointment of congressional chaplains, the provision in the Northwest Ordinance 
for religious education, the resolutions calling upon the President to proclaim days 
of prayer and thanksgiving, the Indian treaties under which Congress paid the 
salaries of priests and clergy.73 
                                                                                                     
71 Nevertheless, Justice Sotomayor does not invoke the “wall of separation” metaphor in her Trinity 
Lutheran dissent. See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2027–41 (Sotomayor & Ginsburg, JJ., 
dissenting). The phrase does not appear in the Constitution or the drafters’ contemporaneous 
documents. It was first used by Thomas Jefferson, in an 1802 letter to the President of the Danbury 
Baptist Association. See DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION 
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 48 (2002) (reproducing Ltr. from Thomas Jefferson, Pres. of the U.S., 
to Danbury Baptist Assn. (Jan. 1, 1802) [hereinafter “Danbury Letter”]). It was adopted by the 
Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (holding that a federal law 
criminalizing bigamy does not violate the Free Exercise Clause), and the Court used it later in 
Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (holding that a state law reimbursing parents for transportation costs to 
private schools, including religious schools, did not violate the Establishment Clause). More 
recently, the authority of that metaphor has been questioned. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 
92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting Jefferson’s absence from the country when the Bill of 
Rights was under consideration by Congress and describing the Danbury Letter as a “short note of 
courtesy”); but see DREISBACH, supra this note, at 26 (noting that President Jefferson did not dismiss 
correspondence like the congratulatory note he received from the Baptist committee in Danbury 
with “merely a cordial response in kind” and explaining that he “thought such correspondence 
furnished an occasion for ‘sowing useful truth & principles among the people, which might 
germinate and become rooted among their political tenets’” (quoting Ltr. from Thomas Jefferson, 
Pres. of the U.S., to Levi Lincoln, Att’y Gen. of the U.S. (Jan 1, 1802)). See infra note 170 for a full 
reproduction of the passage from the Danbury Letter in which President Jefferson used the “wall of 
separation” metaphor for the first time. 
72 Justice Breyer has not supported a strict separation view of the Establishment Clause for some 
time. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 699 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(explaining that the Establishment Clause, read against the background of history, cannot “compel 
the government to purge from the public sphere all that in any way partakes of the religious” 
(citation omitted)); see also Howard Friedman, Justice Breyer Discusses Establishment Clause, 
RELIGION CLAUSE (Jan. 26, 2006), http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2006/01/justice-breyer-
discusses-establishment.html (reporting that, in a then-recent dialogue with the Kesher Israel 
Congregation in the District of Columbia, “[Justice] Breyer said the Establishment Clause was 
designed not as an ‘absolute separation’ of church and state, but as a way to ‘minimize social 
conflict based on religion’”). 
73 Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
933, 939 (1986). The author was a professor of law at the University of Chicago when he wrote this 
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And he argues against the “constitutional rule of secularism”74 apparently favored 
by Justice Sotomayor in her Trinity Lutheran dissent.75 He believes that, with respect 
to government financial-assistance programs, the government must strike a neutral 
position between religion and secularism, as well as between religions.76 
Abstractly, that proposition—supporting with public funds the socially valuable 
programs of religious institutions that mirror the programs of secular institutions—
makes sense. The difficulty arises when the ostensibly secular program of a religious 
institution approaches the core of religious worship. As Justice Sotomayor noted, 
with Lemon still on the books, government aid that has the purpose or effect of 
advancing religion violates the Establishment Clause,77 which “prohibits the direct 
funding of religious activities.”78 
These formidable establishment constraints explain why the majority opinion in 
Trinity Lutheran was greeted so enthusiastically in accommodation quarters. It is a 
prime example of the accommodation vision of the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment: a narrow view of the Establishment Clause and an expansive view of 
the Free Exercise Clause. 
I am not troubled by the Trinity Lutheran outcome on its facts. Playgrounds are 
far from the core of religious worship. The challenge going forward, however, will 
be the formulation of a limiting principle so that the free exercise rationale of Trinity 
Lutheran—that government may not impose an impermissible choice on a religious 
institution—does not engulf the Establishment Clause in cases where there is a 
demand for the inclusion of religious institutions in public benefits programs that fall 
closer to the core of worship. 
Those cases are surely coming,79 and the justices know it. In a controversial 
footnote in Trinity Lutheran, the likely price for getting some of the other justices to 
join his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts wrote: “This case involves express 
discrimination based on religious identity with respect to playground resurfacing. 
                                                                                                     
article and is now a professor at Stanford Law School. In between those academic appointments, 
however, he was Judge McConnell of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 
74 Id. at 940 (concluding that the government can “pursue its legitimate purposes even if to do so 
incidentally assists the various religions”). 
75 See 137 S. Ct. at 2030 (Sotomayor & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (pointing out that “[t]he Church 
has a religious mission, one that it pursues through the Learning Center”). 
76 McConnell, supra note 73, at 940. 
77 See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2029 (Sotomayor & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
78 Id. at 2030. 
79 See Association of Christian Schools International News Release, ACSI Hails Landmark Supreme 
Court 7-2 Ruling in Religious Liberty Case (June 26, 2017), available 
at https://www.acsi.org/Documents/Legal%20Legislative/LAC/Trinity%20Lutheran%20SCOTUS%20R
uling_web.pdf (“This victory means that government cannot discriminate against religious organizations 
and exclude them from receiving a generally available public benefit simply because they are religious. 
It calls into question state Blaine amendments which have been used to exclude faith-based institutions 
from public programs of general application.”).  At the time that I first wrote this essay and it was 
published in the Journal of Appellate Practice and Process, the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in 
such a case but had not yet decided the case.  See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 18-1195, 
___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2777 (June 28, 2019) (granting certiorari).  Just days before the publication of 
this volume, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Espinoza.  I provide an analysis of that decision 
and its potential impact in a new Postscript, see infra section VII. 
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We do not address religious uses of funding or other forms of discrimination.”80 In a 
concurring opinion joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch took strong exception 
to this footnote, calling it an “ad hoc improvisation” that 
some might mistakenly read . . . to suggest that only “playground resurfacing” 
cases, or only those with some association with children’s safety or health, or 
perhaps some other social good we find sufficiently worthy, are governed by the 
legal rules recounted in and faithfully applied by the court’s opinion.81 
Like the drama that will unfold in the public square in a sequel to Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, the sequel to Trinity Lutheran will be divisive and portentous, forcing 
lower courts, and eventually the Supreme Court, to weigh the competing Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clause concerns generated by these public benefit cases. 
IV. TOWN OF GREECE: TRADITION AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES 
Protecting religious minorities has long been at the forefront of First 
Amendment jurisprudence.82 The Court’s 2014 decision in Town of Greece reversed 
that paradigm, favoring a majority religious practice over the concerns of religious 
minorities. 
A. Precedent: Marsh v. Chambers 
    Marsh v. Chambers,83 decided in 1983, is essential for understanding Town 
of Greece. The Marsh Court “found no First Amendment violation in the Nebraska 
Legislature’s practice of opening its sessions with a prayer delivered by a chaplain 
paid from state funds.”84 Noting that Congress had practiced legislative prayer since 
the Constitution’s framing, and that the majority of state legislatures then used 
legislative prayers, the Court concluded that “legislative prayer, while religious in 
nature, has long been understood as compatible with the Establishment Clause.”85 
Relying on history and tradition to justify Nebraska’s legislative prayer, the 
Court in Marsh chose not to apply the Establishment Clause test set forth in Lemon.86 
This three-part test—requiring a secular legislative purpose, a principal or primary 
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and an effect that does not foster an 
                                                                                                     
80 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024 n.3. 
81 Id. at 2026 (Gorsuch & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part). 
82 Cf. Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (pointing out that “the First 
Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of those whose religious practices are not 
shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostility. The history of our free exercise doctrine 
amply demonstrates the harsh impact majoritarian rule has had on unpopular or emerging religious 
groups”); Everson, 330 U.S. at 8–10 (explaining that the chief evil addressed by the Establishment 
Clause is hostility toward religious dissenters). 
83 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
84 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575 (describing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792). 
85 Id. 
86 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607 (finding statute that provided state funding for non-public, non-secular 
schools in violation of the Establishment Clause because it created excessive entanglement of state 
and church). 
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“excessive entanglement with religion”87—was not casually derived. Instead, it 
reflects “consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many 
years.”88 And it is a stringent test. The statute or governmental practice at issue has 
to meet each part of the test to survive an Establishment Clause challenge. That 
stringency prompted the majority in Marsh to rely on history and tradition as a more 
congenial way to analyze the constitutionality of Nebraska’s legislative prayer.89 
B. Town of Greece’s Message to Minority Religious Groups 
Town of Greece pushed the boundaries of Marsh into new territory. In 1999, 
Greece assigned a town employee to find someone to lead the assembled in prayer 
at the start of each meeting of the town council. The employee made calls every 
month to congregations mentioned in a local newspaper or local directory, both of 
which listed only Christian churches, until she found an available clergyperson. As 
a result, all the prayer leaders from 1999 to 2007 were Christian. Most of their 
prayers invoked “Jesus,” “Christ,” “your Son,” or the “Holy Spirit,” and they usually 
closed with phrases like “in the name of Jesus Christ” or “in the name of your Son.” 
Often, the prayer leader would ask the members of the public to stand during the 
prayer.90 
Not surprisingly, two residents—one a Jew, the other an atheist—sued the town, 
asserting that it had violated the Establishment Clause by preferring Christians over 
other prayer leaders and by sponsoring sectarian prayers. They sought an injunction 
that would limit the town to “inclusive and ecumenical” prayers that referred only to 
a “generic God” and would not associate the government with any one faith or belief. 
The complaining residents lost in the district court but won before the Second 
Circuit, which applied a modified version of the Lemon test and concluded that the 
town’s prayer practice impermissibly endorsed Christianity.91 But the Supreme 
Court held, in a five-to-four decision written by Justice Kennedy, that the town’s 
prayer practice did not violate the Establishment Clause.92 
                                                                                                     
87 Id. at 612–13. The Lemon test has been applied to governmental practices as well as to statutes. 
See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (applying Lemon test to uphold city’s practice of 
displaying a crèche among other Christmas decorations, such as a Santa Claus house and reindeer). 
88 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
89 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786. In dissent, Justice Brennan chided the majority for this refusal to apply 
Lemon. See id. at 797 (“The Court makes no pretense of subjecting Nebraska’s practice of legislative 
prayer to any of the formal ‘tests’ that have traditionally structured our inquiry under the 
Establishment Clause.”). 
90 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 571–72. 
91 Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2012). The “endorsement test” was first 
developed by Justice O’Connor in Lynch. See 465 U.S. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice 
O’Connor explained that there were “two principal ways” in which government might violate the 
Establishment Clause: by fostering “excessive entanglement” between government and religious 
institutions, or by communicating endorsement or disapproval of religion. Id. at 687–91. The 
endorsement test combines the purpose and effects prongs of the Lemon test into one “endorsement 
prong.” The Supreme Court adopted Justice O’Connor’s formulation of the endorsement test in 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) 573, 594–97 (1989) (describing the rationale of 
the majority opinion in Lynch as “none too clear” and relying on Justice O’Connor’s concurrence 
to apply the endorsement test). 
92 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575. 
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As in Marsh, the Court in Town of Greece relied on history and tradition, and 
ignored Lemon, in finding Greece’s prayer practice constitutional. Indeed, the parties 
in their briefing did not even argue that Lemon governed.93 Still, Justice Kennedy 
felt the need to justify once again the choice made in Marsh to “carve out an 
exception” to the court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence: “The Court in Marsh 
found those [Lemon] tests unnecessary because history supported the conclusion that 
legislative invocations are compatible with the Establishment Clause.”94 Thus, he 
said, any Establishment Clause test “must acknowledge a practice that was accepted 
by the Framers and has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political change,”95 
and the relevant inquiry in Town of Greece was “whether the prayer practice . . . fits 
within the tradition long followed in Congress and the state legislatures.”96 
The plaintiffs argued that the town’s prayer practice did not fit within that 
tradition because the sectarian language of the prayers violated the Establishment 
Clause principle of neutrality, and the impact of the prayers on some members of the 
public violated its prohibition against government coercion of religious practice. 
Non-Christians seated in the public meeting space at the town hall during the prayer 
would feel that they must “remain in the room or even feign participation in order to 
avoid offending the representatives who sponsor the prayer and will vote on matters 
citizens bring before the board.”97 
Justice Kennedy rejected the sectarian-prayer argument with notable heat. These 
seriatim statements capture his tone: 
An insistence on nonsectarian or ecumenical prayer as a single, fixed standard is not 
consistent with the tradition of legislative prayer outlined in the Court’s cases.98 
***** 
The decidedly Christian nature of these prayers must not be dismissed as the relic 
of a time when our Nation was less pluralistic than it is today.99 
***** 
Government may not mandate a civic religion that stifles any but the most generic 
reference to the sacred any more than it may prescribe a religious orthodoxy.100 
***** 
The First Amendment is not a majority rule, and government may not seek to define 
permissible categories of religious speech. Once it invites prayer into the public 
sphere, government must permit a prayer giver to address his or her own God or 
                                                                                                     
93 The Town of Greece discussed Lemon in its petition for certiorari, primarily to characterize it as 
inapplicable to the case. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 
565 (2014) (No. 12-696), 2012 WL 6054799, at *18–*19. Similarly, the complaining citizens did 
not primarily rely on Lemon in their brief, arguing instead that the town’s prayer practice was 
unconstitutionally “coercive.” See Brief for Respondents, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 
565 (2014) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL 5230742, at *17–*18; but see Brief of Erwin Chemerinsky & 
Alan Brownstein as Amici Curiae in support of Respondents, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 
U.S. 565 (2014) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL 5323367 at *3–*4 (advocating reliance on Lemon). 
94 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575. 
95 Id. at 577. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 578. 
99 Id. at 579. 
100 Id. at 581 (citation omitted). 
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gods as conscience dictates, unfettered by what an administrator or judge considers 
to be nonsectarian.101 
Are there any protections for religious minorities in this embrace of sectarian 
legislative prayer? Not many: 
If the course and practice over time shows that the invocation denigrates 
nonbelievers or religious minorities, threatens damnation, or preach[es] conversion, 
many present may consider the prayer to fall short of the desire to elevate the 
purpose of the occasion and to unite lawmakers in their common effort. That 
circumstance would present a different case than the one presently before the 
Court.102 
In other words, nonbelievers and religious minorities attending a council meeting in 
Greece must be pummeled with threats of damnation or conversion before they might 
have a cognizable grievance about sectarian legislative prayer. 
As for coercion, Justice Kennedy noted that some of the plaintiffs stated at trial 
that “the prayers gave them offense and made them feel excluded and disrespected,” 
but, he pointed out, “[o]ffense . . . does not equate to coercion.”103 To the contrary, 
he said, “[o]ur tradition assumes that adult citizens, firm in their own beliefs, can 
tolerate and perhaps appreciate a ceremonial prayer delivered by a person of a 
different faith.”104 If they cannot tolerate such a prayer, and they chose to “exit the 
[council] room during a prayer they find distasteful, their absence will not stand out 
as disrespectful or even noteworthy.”105 If they chose to remain in the room, their 
“quiet acquiescence will not, in light of our traditions, be interpreted as an agreement 
with the words or ideas expressed.”106 
Justice Kagan wrote the principal dissent—joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, 
and Sotomayor—in which she agreed with the decision in Marsh. She did not believe 
that a town hall meeting must “become a religion-free zone.”107 She accepted Justice 
Kennedy’s description of the issue as “whether the prayer practice in the town of 
Greece fits within the tradition long followed in Congress and the state 
legislatures.”108 But, unlike Justice Kennedy, she concluded that it did not. 
Whereas the prayer practice in Marsh “ha[d] [not] been exploited to proselytize 
or advance any one . . . faith or belief,”109 Justice Kagan noted that the prayers in the 
Greece council meetings were “constantly” and “exclusively” Christian.110 Hence 
                                                                                                     
101 Id. at 582. 
102 Id. at 583. 
103 Id. at 589. 
104 Id. at 584 (citation omitted). 
105 Id. at 590. For a similar perspective, see Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 
232–33 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (expressing skepticism toward Establishment Clause claim 
where child could “join religious classes [at his public school] if he cho[se] . . . or . . . stay out of 
them” because, although “the Constitution . . . protects the right to dissent,” it “may be doubted” 
whether it offers “protect[ion] . . . from the embarrassment that always attends nonconformity”). 
106 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 590. 
107 Id. at 616 (Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting). 
108 Id. at 622. 
109 Id. at 627 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95). 
110 Id. at 627–28. 
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those prayers violated the Establishment Clause’s neutrality requirement, which 
prohibits the government from favoring or aligning itself with any particular creed.111 
Addressing the issue of coercion, Justice Kagan envisioned a Muslim resident 
of Greece, present at the council meeting only because she wants to conduct some 
business. The Muslim woman (who could be a member of any religious minority) 
immediately faces a dilemma described by Justice Kagan: 
She does not wish to be rude to her neighbors, nor does she wish to aggravate the 
Board members whom she will soon be trying to persuade. . . . And she thus stands 
at a remove, based solely on religion, from her fellow citizens and her elected 
representatives.112 
In reality, that Muslim woman has only three options: acquiesce in the prayer 
practice by standing with everyone else when the minister asks them to do so; sit and 
seem disrespectful; or leave the council chambers. She does not want to do any of 
those. At the heart of her dilemma is government coercion. 
C. The Accommodation Vision Gone Awry 
As I have written before,113 Town of Greece is a terrible decision, an example of 
the accommodation vision gone awry. Justice Kennedy gave primacy in the public 
square—here, the public meeting space in a town hall—to Christian prayer, without 
understanding its impact on those who do not share Christian beliefs. As Professor 
Neuborne put it, until Town of Greece, 
[t]he Court always asked whether the nonbelieving hearer was made to feel like an 
outsider in her own land. After Town of Greece, nonbelieving hearers subjected to 
government-sponsored religious speech may well be told “Get a thicker skin. After 
all, this is a Christian country. You’re here as a tolerated guest.”114 
Or, as longtime Supreme Court observer Linda Greenhouse explained,  
[c]lassically, the Supreme Court invoked the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment . . . on behalf of minority religions. Rulings on behalf of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses who wouldn’t salute the flag, Amish parents who wouldn’t send their 
children to high school and non-Christians who objected to organized prayer in 
public school form the backbone of the First Amendment canon.115  
But in Town of Greece, “the court’s concern . . . flipped,” and the Court invoked the 
accommodation vision of the Establishment Clause on behalf of a majority 
religion.116 
That flip would not have occurred if the Court had applied the Lemon test to 
                                                                                                     
111 Id. at 629 (noting that the prayer practice in Greece could not rely on “the protective ambit of 
Marsh and the history on which it relied”). 
112 Id. at 630, 631. 
113 See Kermit V. Lipez, George Washington, Elena Kagan, and the Town of Greece, New York: 
The First Amendment and Religious Minorities, 16 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1 (2015). 
114 BURT NEUBOURNE, MADISON’S MUSIC: ON READING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 143–44 (2015). 
115 Linda Greenhouse, How the Supreme Court Grasps Religion, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/10/opinion/supreme-court-religion.html.   
116 Id. 
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Greece’s prayer practice. Although using a prayer to solemnize the deliberations of 
the council meets the secular-purpose requirement of the Lemon test, Greece’s prayer 
practice fails Lemon’s neither-advance-nor-inhibit requirement. That practice 
advanced Christianity, exclusively offering Christian prayers that “sen[t] a message 
to nonadherents that they [were] outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they [were] insiders, 
favored members of the political community.”117 What followed was the religious 
divisiveness that the Establishment Clause was designed to prevent.118 
That likelihood of a negative outcome for Greece’s prayer practice if the Lemon 
test had been applied explains Justice Kennedy’s decision to eschew Lemon in favor 
of a test that would “acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Framers and 
has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political change.”119 Lemon does not 
include an historical analysis that revisits a country in the late eighteenth century that 
was almost exclusively Christian. Instead, its purpose, effect, and excessive-
entanglement prongs focus on the here and now in a country that is far more 
religiously diverse than the country known to the Framers. 
If history and tradition control the contemporary application of the 
Establishment Clause, it is easy to understand Justice Kennedy’s comfort with the 
exclusively Christian prayers offered in the town of Greece. However, his comfort 
is not shared by the non-Christians who, he said, could “leave the room.” And that 
is why the debate over the preservation of the Lemon test is so consequential. The 
elimination of Lemon in favor of a historically rooted practice test would most likely 
mean, over time, the greater presence of historically dominant Christian traditions in 
the public square, even as our country becomes more pluralistic.120 
V. AMERICAN LEGION AND THE FUTURE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE 
PUBLIC SQUARE 
Recently decided by the Court, American Legion addressed the constitutionality 
of a thirty-two foot121 concrete Latin cross122 on public land. With much more 
                                                                                                     
117 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
118 See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining that one of 
the “basic purposes” of the Establishment Clause is “to avoid that divisiveness based upon religion 
that promotes social conflict, sapping the strength of government and religion alike”); see also 
Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1831, 1834 (2009) (referring to “the prevention of division along religious lines or of 
alienation” as “the themes that dominate contemporary thought about disestablishment”). 
119 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577. 
120 See Philip A. Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate about Equal 
Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 295 (1992) (describing religious—and 
overtly Christian—character of early civil-rights discourse). 
121 Actually, if one considers the pedestal on which the Cross stands, it is about forty feet high. See 
Marty Lederman, Three Things About the “Peace Cross” Case that Everyone Should—But Not 
Quite Everyone Does—Agree Upon, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 25, 2019), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/02/three-things-about-peace-cross-case.html. 
122 In American Legion, the Court described the “Latin cross” as follows:  
The Latin form of the cross “has a longer upright than crossbar. The intersection of the two 
is usually such that the upper and the two horizontal arms are all of about equal length, but 
the lower arm is conspicuously longer.” G. Ferguson, Signs & Symbols in Christian Art 
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disarray among the Justices, this case renewed the debate about the use of history 
and tradition in Establishment Clause jurisprudence and the preservation of the 
Lemon test. 
A. Two Precedents: Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary County v. ACLU of 
Kentucky 
In 2005, the Supreme Court decided two so-called passive symbol cases, Van 
Orden v. Perry123 and McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky124—both involving 
displays of the Ten Commandments—that framed the doctrinal debate in American 
Legion. In Van Orden, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a six-foot granite 
monolith displaying the Ten Commandments erected in 1961 between the state 
capital and the supreme court building in Austin, Texas. Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence holding that monument consistent with the Establishment Clause 
became the controlling opinion of the Court in Van Orden.125 In McCreary, in which 
the Court declared unconstitutional two Kentucky-courthouse displays of the Ten 
Commandments installed in 1999, Justice Breyer provided the fifth vote for the 
majority. However, the analytical approaches he adopted in the two cases were quite 
different. 
In his concurrence in Van Orden, Justice Breyer applied a multi-factor analysis 
that requires the exercise of “legal judgment” rather than reliance on any particular 
test.126 In McCreary, Justice Breyer joined a decision written by Justice Souter 
applying the Lemon test and concluding that the displays failed the first prong of the 
Lemon test because the displays were religiously motivated and not neutral. As 
Justice Souter put it, “we have not made the purpose test a pushover for any secular 
claim.”127 With these models of decisionmaking before the Court in American 
Legion,128 the Justices had to choose between them. 
B. A Plethora of Opinions 
In 1918, a committee appointed in Prince George’s County, Maryland, to design 
and erect a World War I memorial settled on the large Latin cross that now stands at 
                                                                                                     
294 (1954). See also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1276 (1981) (“latin 
cross, n.”: “a figure of a cross having a long upright shaft and a shorter crossbar traversing 
it above the middle”). 
139 S. Ct. at 2075 n.6. 
123 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
124 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
125 Justice Breyer’s concurrence controls because, under Supreme Court practice, “[w]hen a 
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
five justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those members who 
concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.’” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 
(1977) (quoting Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, 
JJ.)). 
126 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
127 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 864. 
128 See American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2074–76; see also id. at 2083 (discussing Van Orden, 
McCreary, and the secular motivations behind placement of Ten Commandments monuments 
around the country in the 1950s). 
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the terminus of the National Defense Highway, which connects Washington, D.C., 
to Annapolis.129 Known as the Bladensburg Cross or Peace Cross, it sits on a large 
pedestal that displays the American Legion’s emblem and the words “Valor,” 
“Endurance,” “Courage,” and “Devotion.” The pedestal also features a large plaque 
listing the names of the forty-nine local men who died in the War and explaining that 
the monument is “dedicated to the heroes of Prince George’s County, Maryland who 
lost their lives in the great war for the liberty of the world.”130 
Over the years, memorials honoring the veterans of other conflicts have been 
added to the surrounding area, which is now known as Veterans Memorial Park, but 
the limited space around the Peace Cross has left the closest of these other 
monuments 200 feet away.131 In 1961, the Maryland-National Capital Park and 
Planning Commission acquired the Cross and the land on which it sits to preserve 
the monument and address traffic safety concerns.132 Since then, the Commission has 
spent $117,000 to maintain and preserve the Cross, and it budgeted an additional 
$100,000 for renovations and repairs to the Cross in 2008.133 
In 2012, the American Humanist Association134 sued the Commission, alleging 
that the Cross’s presence on public land and its maintenance by the Commission 
violated the Establishment Clause,135 and seeking “removal or demolition of the 
Cross, or removal of the arms from the Cross, to form a non-religious slab or 
obelisk.”136 The American Legion intervened to defend the Cross.137 The district 
court held the display constitutional under both the Lemon test and the factors in 
Justice Breyer’s Van Orden concurrence.138 Using the same criteria, the Fourth 
Circuit reversed.139 The Commission and the American Legion both petitioned for 
certiorari, which the Court granted. The American Legion urged the Court to 
abandon the Lemon test.140 The Commission advocated the applicability of both 
                                                                                                     
129 Id. at 2076–77. The County erected the monument in 1925 with the assistance of the American 
Legion. Id. at 2077. The Cross is apparently an impressive sight, particularly at night. “Approaching 
from the south on Bladensburg Road (or probably from any other direction), the illuminated 
concrete Latin cross, forty-feet tall, dominates the landscape like a beacon. It appears unexpectedly, 
seemingly out of nowhere and lacking any evident context, and as you approach the oddity of it will 
only deepen, as you come to see that it stands alone on a grassy, crescent-shaped traffic island at 
the intersection of two very busy thoroughfares.” Lederman, supra note 121. 
130 American Legion, 139 S. Ct. 2067, at 2077. 
131 Id. at 2077–78. 
132 Id. at 2078. 
133 Id. 
134 The Association is an organization whose mission is “to advance an ethical and life-affirming 
philosophy free of belief in any gods and other supernatural forces.” Frequently Asked Questions, 
AM. HUMANIST ASS’N (2019), https://american humanist.org//about/faq/. 




138 Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park, 147 F. Supp. 3d 373 (D. Md. 2015)), rev’d, 874 
F.3d 195 (4th Cir. 2017). 
139 Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 874 F.3d 195 (4th 
Cir. 2017). 
140 Reply Brief for the American Legion Petitioners, Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Am. Legion, ___ U.S. 
___, 139 S. Ct 2067 (2019) (No. 17-1717), 2019 WL 644950, at *6–*9. 
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Lemon and Justice Breyer’s approach in Van Orden.141 
By a vote of seven to two, the Court vacated the judgment of the Fourth Circuit 
and remanded. The appeal produced seven opinions. The syllabus of the Court’s 
decision offers a summary of the Justices’ votes that almost defies description.142 
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kavanaugh, Breyer and 
Kagan, wrote a five-member majority opinion. Within that majority opinion is a four-
member plurality opinion, written by Justice Alito and joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Kavanaugh and Breyer. It is a plurality opinion because Justice 
Kagan declined to join two parts of Justice Alito’s opinion. Thus, where Justice 
Kagan joined Justice Alito’s opinion, Justice Alito wrote for a majority of the Court; 
where she did not join, Justice Alito wrote for only a four-member plurality. Then, 
Justices Kavanaugh, Kagan, and Breyer each wrote a concurring opinion. Although 
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch also wrote concurrences, they concurred only in the 
judgment to vacate, writing separately to distance themselves from Justice Alito’s 
majority opinion. Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justice Sotomayor. 
C. Justice Alito’s Opinion 
In his introduction to the majority opinion, Justice Alito invoked a theme that 
dominated the opinions of the Justices—the link between the “removal or radical 
alteration”143 of the Cross and the public perception of hostility to religion. Part I of 
his opinion described the evolution of the cross from a symbol of Christianity to one 
with various contemporary meanings, some of which are “now almost entirely 
secular.”144 And he also noted that its use as a World War I symbol reflected “the 
Cross’s widespread acceptance as a symbol of sacrifice in the war.”145 
This emphasis on the secular significance of the Cross reflected a factor 
important to Justice Breyer in Van Orden, where he wrote that the Ten 
Commandments, in certain contexts, can convey “a secular moral message (about 
proper standards of social conduct) . . . [a]nd . . . a historical message (about a 
historic relation between those standards and the law).”146 To a considerable extent, 
Justice Breyer’s Van Orden concurrence provided a roadmap for Justice Alito’s 
opinion. 
                                                                                                     
141 Brief for Petitioner Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, Am. Humanist Ass’n v. 
Am. Legion, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct 2067 (2019) (No. 18-18), 2018 WL 6706089, at *20, *54. 
142 American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2067 (reporting that “ALITO, J., announced the judgment of the 
Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-B, II-C, III, and IV, in which 
ROBERTS, C.J., and BREYER, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined, and an opinion with 
respect to Parts II-A and II-D, in which ROBERTS, C.J., and BREYER and KAVANAUGH, JJ., 
joined. BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KAGAN, J., joined. KAVANAUGH, J., 
filed a concurring opinion. KAGAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part. THOMAS, J., filed an 
opinion concurring in the judgment. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in 
which THOMAS, J., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, 
J., joined.”). 
143 Id. at 2074. 
144 Id.; see also id. at 2074–75 (describing secular crosses such as “[t]he familiar symbol of the Red 
Cross” and those that appear as the registered trademark for businesses and secular organizations, 
like Blue Cross/Blue Shield, the Bayer Group, and Johnson & Johnson). 
145 Id. at 2076. 
146 See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701. 
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Part II, divided into four subparts (A, B, C, and D), is the heart of Justice Alito’s 
opinion; its subparts B and C, which commanded a majority of the Court, created 
new law. 
1. New Law: Subparts B and C 
In subparts B and C, Justice Alito gave four reasons why the Lemon test does 
not apply to “monuments, symbols or practices that were first established long 
ago.”147 First, identifying the original purpose or purposes of an older monument 
may be “especially difficult.”148 Second, the purposes associated with an established 
monument may multiply over time.149 Third, the message conveyed by a monument 
may also evolve over time.150 Fourth, given this evolution of purpose and meaning 
for a monument, any attempt to remove it may “no longer appear neutral, especially 
to the local community for which it has taken on particular meaning.”151 Justice Alito 
emphasized this point in stark terms: 
A government that roams the land, tearing down monuments with religious 
symbolism and scrubbing away any reference to the divine will strike many as 
aggressively hostile to religion. Militantly secular regimes have carried out such 
projects in the past.152 
He then created a presumption of constitutionality for old religious monuments: 
These four considerations show that retaining established, religiously expressive 
monuments, symbols, and practices is quite different from erecting or adopting new 
ones. The passage of time gives rise to a strong presumption of constitutionality.153 
With Justice Kagan joining this part of Justice Alito’s opinion, there is now new 
law—a presumption of constitutionality for established religiously expressive 
monuments, symbols, and practices. The Lemon test has become irrelevant to 
Establishment Clause challenges to such items.154 
2. The Plurality Opinion: Subparts A and D and Justice Kagan’s Reservations 
Subpart A contains the plurality opinion’s extensive criticism of the Lemon test, 
describing its origins, uneven application over the years by the Supreme Court, 
criticism by some Justices, lower court judges, and scholars, and particular 
shortcomings in a case “involv[ing] the use for ceremonial, celebratory, or 
                                                                                                     
147 American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2082. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 2083. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 2084. 
152 Id. at 2084–85. 
153 Id. at 2085 (emphasis added). 
154 Does this mean that American Legion has overruled McCreary? Probably not. Those Ten 
Commandments displays were installed in the summer of 1999. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 851. The 
lawsuit challenging them was filed several months later. In that situation, the displays seem more 
new than established. Still, the line between “new” and “established” will surely be the subject of 
future litigation. See supra p. 347-48. 
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commemorative purposes, of words or symbols with religious associations.”155 
Having discredited the use of the Lemon test for analyzing Establishment Clause 
challenges to longstanding monuments, Justice Alito explained in subpart D that the 
Court should draw on history for guidance in deciding American Legion, much as it 
did in deciding the legislative prayers at issue in Marsh and Town of Greece.156 
In her concurrence, Justice Kagan explained her refusal to join Justice Alito’s 
opinion in its entirety. She refused to join his critique of Lemon in Subpart A because, 
although a “rigid application of the Lemon test does not solve every Establishment 
Clause problem,” she still found value in “that test’s focus on purposes and effects  
. . . in evaluating government action in this sphere.”157 She declined to join Subpart 
D because, although she too “look[s] to history for guidance, . . . [she would] prefer 
at least for now to do so case-by-case, rather to sign on to any broader statements 
about history’s role in Establishment Clause analysis.”158 
Given Justice Kagan’s dissent in Town of Greece, I understand why Justice 
Alito’s reliance in Subpart D on Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in that case 
made her wary. Justice Kennedy had insisted that the town’s Christian legislative 
prayers should not be regarded as relics of a “less pluralistic” society.159 But there is 
a critical difference between the “new” legislative prayer practice in Town of Greece 
and the “old” Cross in American Legion. The Cross had stood for eighty-nine years 
before it was challenged. Greece inaugurated its prayer practice in 1999, and the 
lawsuit challenging it was filed in 2008.160 Hence, the specific prayer practice in 
Town of Greece was not nearly so time-honored as the Cross. Understanding this 
distinction, Justice Alito apparently felt the need to make the prayer practice in Town 
of Greece venerable, not in terms of years, but in its link to an established tradition 
of legislative prayer in Congress and state legislatures: 
Of course, the specific practice challenged in Town of Greece lacked the very direct 
connection, via the First Congress, to the thinking of those who were responsible 
for framing the First Amendment. But what matters was that the town’s practice “fit 
within the tradition long followed in Congress and the state legislature.”161 
In other words, for Justice Alito, tradition casts a long shadow that must inform 
the contemporary application of the Establishment Clause. Does that mean that a 
new religious monument in a public park or building, compatible with a venerable 
tradition of placing such monuments in such settings, would survive an 
Establishment Clause challenge on that basis alone? Justice Alito’s language could 
be read that way. Justice Kagan is reluctant to give history and tradition such 
                                                                                                     
155 American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2081 (footnote omitted). 
156 Id. at 2087. 
157 Id. at 2094 (Kagan, J., concurring in part). 
158 Id. 
159 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 579. 
160 See Galloway v. Town of Greece, 732 F. Supp. 2d 195, 197, 205, 209 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(indicating that the town’s prayer practice began in 1999, that one of the plaintiffs raised her 
objection to it at a town board meeting in 2007, that plaintiffs met with town officials on another 
occasion in 2007 to raise their objection a second time, and that plaintiffs filed their complaint in 
2008). 
161 American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2088–89 (citation omitted). 
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determinative force in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
D. Lemon’s Fate and the Presumption of Constitutionality 
American Legion raises two questions about the current state of Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence: 
 What is the status of the Lemon test?  
 Does the “presumption of constitutionality” apply only to old 
monuments? 
1. Lemon 
If Justice Kagan had joined Justice Alito’s general critique of Lemon in Part II-
A of his opinion, there might be an argument that Lemon is all but dead. But she did 
not join Part II-A for the express purpose of preserving Lemon in some 
circumstances.162 
That act of preservation annoyed three of her concurring colleagues. Justice 
Kavanaugh devoted most of his concurrence to demonstrating the uselessness of 
Lemon.163 Justice Thomas, who believes that the Establishment Clause should not 
apply to the states at all, urged the Court to “take the logical next step and overrule 
the Lemon test in all contexts.”164 Justice Gorsuch praised the plurality’s critique of 
Lemon and referred to the test as “now shelved.”165 If nothing else, these frustrated 
critiques confirm that Lemon has survived another challenge. 
2. The Presumption of Constitutionality 
Justice Alito’s majority opinion held that “retaining established, religiously 
expressive monuments, symbols and practices is quite different from erecting or 
adopting new ones. The passage of time gives rise to a strong presumption of 
constitutionality.”166 Yet, his plurality opinion suggested that practices or displays 
that imitate or draw upon tradition, whatever their age, should enjoy the same 
presumption. Justice Kagan wrote separately to distance herself from that 
conclusion, and Justice Breyer concurred with a limiting observation: “Nor do I 
understand the Court’s opinion today to adopt a ‘history and tradition test’ that would 
permit any newly constructed religious memorial on public land.”167 
Justice Kagan’s caution and Justice Breyer’s observation elicited a remarkable 
                                                                                                     
162 Justice Breyer joined Justice Alito’s opinion in full, including its broad critique of Lemon, even 
though he had joined Justice Souter’s majority opinion in McCreary applying the Lemon test to the 
Ten Commandments placed in the Kentucky courthouses. See American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2091 
(Breyer, J., concurring). But it is premature to list Justice Breyer as a Lemon rejectionist. At the end 
of Part II-A, where Justice Alito first refers to “a presumption of constitutionality for longstanding 
monuments, symbols, and practices,” he focuses on the limitations of Lemon when applied to such 
cases as capturing the full extent of Lemon rejection in the plurality opinion. See id. at 2079–81. 
This part cannot be fairly read as a rejection of Lemon for all purposes. 
163 See American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2092 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
164 Id. at 2097 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
165 Id. at 2101 (Gorsuch & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment). 
166 Id. at 2085 (emphasis added). 
167 Id. at 2019 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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passage in Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence. Dismissive of the “presumption of 
constitutionality” fashioned by the majority (“How old must a monument, symbol or 
practice be to qualify for this new presumption?”),168 he insisted that the plurality 
opinion contained a hidden message about the scope of the presumption of 
constitutionality that the lower courts should follow: 
Though the plurality does not say so in as many words, the message for our lower 
court colleagues seems unmistakable: Whether a monument, symbol, or practice is 
old or new, apply Town of Greece, not Lemon. Indeed, some of our colleagues 
recognize this implication and blanch at its prospect. . . . But if that’s the real 
message of the plurality’s opinion, it seems to me exactly right—because what 
matters when it comes to assessing a monument, symbol, or practice isn’t its age but 
its compliance with ageless principles. The Constitution’s meaning is fixed, not 
some good-for-this-day-only coupon, and a practice consistent with our nation’s 
traditions is just as permissible whether undertaken today or 94 years ago.169 
In other words, in the application of the new presumption of constitutionality, 
the lower courts should ignore the majority opinion, apply the plurality opinion, and, 
in so doing, treat old and new monuments, symbols, or practices the same way. Given 
the competing views of Justice Breyer and Justice Gorsuch on the scope of the 
presumption, the lower courts will soon see cases featuring this competition. 
E. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent 
In a now familiar pattern (they were also the two dissenters in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop and Trinity Lutheran), Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, 
filed a dissent that sounds increasingly like a lonely call for the restoration of the 
separation vision of the church/state relationship. She even invoked President 
Jefferson’s wall of separation metaphor to bolster her case.170 And she was unsparing 
in her criticism of every element of the majority opinion. 
Justice Ginsburg had no patience with attempts to secularize the Latin cross, 
describing it as “the foremost symbol of the Christian faith.”171 And, “[j]ust as a Star 
of David is not suitable to honor Christians who died serving their country, a cross 
is not suitable to honor those of other faiths who died defending their nation.”172 
                                                                                                     
168 Id. at 2102 (Gorsuch & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment). 
169 Id. 
170 See id. at 2105 (Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Draft Reply to the Danbury 
Baptist Association, in 36 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 254, 255 (B. Oberg ed. 2009)). President 
Jefferson’s now famous “wall of separation” metaphor, see supra note 71, was first used in a letter 
by Jefferson fourteen years after the adoption of the Bill of Rights:  
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God; 
that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers 
of the government reach actions only, and not opinions,—I contemplate with sovereign 
reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature 
should “make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof,” thus building a wall of separation between church and State. 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting Danbury Letter, supra note 71); see 
also supra note 71 (discussing the history of the metaphor in Supreme Court jurisprudence). 
171 American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2104. 
172 Id. 
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She rejected Justice Gorsuch’s suggestion that the “Court’s new presumption 
extends to all governmental displays and practices, regardless of their age.”173 
Equally important in a case in which the survival of the Lemon test was at stake, she 
also applied a variant of Lemon—the endorsement test174—to demonstrate the 
unconstitutionality of the Cross when viewed by a reasonable observer familiar with 
“the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the symbol and its placement.”175 
In an unusual locution even for a dissent, Justice Ginsburg presented herself as 
the reasonable observer: “As I see it,” she wrote, “when a cross is displayed on public 
property, the government may be presumed to endorse its religious content.”176 With 
Justice Ginsburg’s first-person perspective came her identity as a Jew. She explained 
the significance of that identity for the reasonable non-Christian observer: 
To non-Christians, nearly 30% of the population of the United States, . . . the State’s 
choice to display the cross on public buildings or spaces conveys a message of 
exclusion. It tells them they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community.177 
She then put that outsider status in theological terms: 
Under one widespread reading of Christian scripture, non-Christians are barred from 
eternal life and, instead, are condemned to hell . . . . On this reading, the Latin cross 
symbolizes both the promise of salvation and the threat of damnation by dividing 
the world between the saved and the damned.178 
Exaggeration for effect? Perhaps. But Justice Ginsburg’s invocation of the 
damned was no more melodramatic than Justice Alito’s invocation of “militantly 
secular regimes” roaming the land “tearing down monuments with religious 
symbolism.”179 These resorts to hyperbole by ordinarily restrained justices capture 
well the high stakes in American Legion. 
                                                                                                     
173 Id. at 2104 n.2. 
174 See Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 
90 CAL. L. REV. 673, 704–06 (2002) (explaining the transformation of the purpose-and-effects 
prong of the Lemon test into the endorsement test). Elaborated in cases such as Lynch and County 
of Allegheny, involving challenges to religious displays, such as a crèche or menorah on city and 
county property, the endorsement test asks whether the display has the “effect of ‘endorsing’ 
religion,” American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2105 (quoting County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592); see 
also note 91, supra (describing how the endorsement test modified the purpose and effects prongs 
of the Lemon test). 
175 American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2106 (quoting Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 721 (2010)). 
Salazar, like American Legion, concerned the constitutionality of a cross on public land. The district 
court had ordered removal of the cross, but the Supreme Court did not decide the critical question 
of whether the display violated the Establishment Clause. Instead, the Court vacated and remanded 
the case on the narrow ground that the district court had applied the wrong standard in granting 
relief to the petitioner. Salazar, 559 U.S. at 714. Because of its narrow holding, Salazar had little 
bearing on American Legion despite the factual similarities between the cases. 
176 American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2106 (Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
177 Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
178 Id. at 2107 n.6 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
179 Id. at 2085. 
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F. The Conundrum of the Cross 
     Justice Ginsburg’s critique of the majority’s secularization of the Cross is 
powerful. Invoking a visual image in the opening line of her dissent (“An immense 
Latin cross stands on a traffic island at the center of a busy three-way intersection in 
Bladensburg, Maryland”),180 Justice Ginsburg said, in effect, that any observer 
driving through that intersection would see the Cross for what it is: the preeminent 
symbol of Christianity.181 And since the Cross could not be in that public place 
without government permission, she said that the government may be “presumed to 
endorse its religious content.”182 Although this presumption of endorsement could 
be overcome in some situations, she saw no possibility of that here: “Every Court of 
Appeals to confront the question has held that ‘making a . . . Latin cross a war 
memorial does not make the cross secular,’ it ‘makes the war memorial 
sectarian.’”183 From that perspective, the Cross violated a core value of the 
Establishment Clause—government neutrality between religions.184 
But I think that perspective is too narrow. It allows the quintessential nature of 
the Cross as a Christian symbol to so dominate the neutrality analysis that nothing 
else about the Cross matters—its age, origins, physical setting, or acceptance by the 
community where it stands. In the way that Justice Breyer explained in his Van 
Orden concurrence, and reiterated in his American Legion concurrence, these factors 
do matter. As Justice Breyer wrote in American Legion, the record of the case 
indicates that 
the organizers of the Peace Cross acted with the undeniably secular motive of 
commemorating local soldiers; no evidence suggests that they sought to disparage 
or exclude any religious group; the secular values inscribed on the Cross and its 
place among other memorials strengthen its message of patriotism and 
commemoration; and . . . the Cross has stood on the same land for 94 years, 
generating no controversy in the community until this lawsuit was filed. . . . In light 
of all these circumstances, the Peace Cross cannot reasonably be understood as “a 
government effort to favor a particular religious sect” or to “promote religion over 
nonreligion.”185 
                                                                                                     
180 Id. at 2103 (Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting). 
181 Justice Alito had said so previously. See Salazar, 559 U.S. at 725 (Alito, J., concurring in part, 
and concurring in the judgment) (“The cross is of course the preeminent symbol of Christianity 
. . . .” (citation omitted)). 
182 American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2106 (Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting). 
183 Id. at 2108 (citation omitted). 
184 See, e.g., McCreary, 545 U.S. at 874–81 (describing the Supreme Court’s longstanding use of 
the neutrality principle as an “interpretive guide” in Establishment Clause cases); Brendan Beery, 
Prophylactic Free Exercise: The First Amendment and Religion in a Post-Kennedy World, 82 ALB. 
L. REV. 121, 123 & n.18 (2018) (collecting cases for the proposition that, “[a]ccording to the 
Supreme Court, the principle undergirding the Establishment Clause is neutrality”). 
185 American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2091 (Breyer & Kagan, JJ., concurring). In support of Justice 
Breyer’s reading of the record on disparagement or exclusion of any religious group, Professor 
Marty Lederman of Georgetown Law School notes that “Prince Georges County was virtually all-
Christian during World War I and the record doesn’t reflect any basis for the government to have 
had reason to believe that any of the 49 soldiers commemorated by the Cross weren’t Christian.” 
Lederman, supra note 121. 
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Having demonstrated to his satisfaction that the Bladensburg Cross did not 
offend the neutrality principle of the Establishment Clause, Justice Breyer could have 
ended his analysis there. But he went on to make a point about hostility to religion 
made by Justice Alito in his majority opinion: “as the Court explains, ordering [the 
Cross’s] removal or alteration at this late date would signal ‘a hostility toward 
religion that has no place in our Establishment Clause traditions.’”186 At first glance, 
that observation seems odd. Justice Breyer has just explained that the Bladensburg 
Cross can be viewed, under all of the circumstances, as a secular symbol. If that is 
so, why would the alteration or removal of a secular symbol reveal an unwarranted 
hostility to religion? The answer lies in the conundrum of the Cross. Inescapably, as 
Justice Ginsburg demonstrates, the Cross is a religious symbol. But if that fact 
overwhelms the other aspects of the Cross noted by Justice Breyer, the neutrality 
principle of the Establishment Clause becomes so exacting that there is no place for 
religious symbols in the public sector, whatever their provenance. That rigidity 
would reflect an unwarranted hostility to religion. As Justice Breyer wrote in his Van 
Orden concurrence: 
[T]he Establishment Clause does not compel the government to purge from the 
public sphere all that in any way partakes of the religious. . . . Such absolutism is 
not only inconsistent with our national traditions, . . . but would also tend to promote 
the kind of social conflict the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.187 
Agreeing with this analysis, I do not find the outcome of the American Legion 
case troubling. But I do find the opinions of some of the Justices explaining that 
outcome unsettling for two reasons. First, there is the ambiguity in Justice Alito’s 
use of history in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Such history can be used in 
two ways: to defend what is old or to justify what is new. If I thought that Justice 
Alito viewed history only as he suggests he does at times in his opinion—as a defense 
for the survival of old religious monuments or practices (“The passage of time gives 
rise to a strong presumption of constitutionality”188)—I would be less troubled by his 
opinion. But I have little confidence that Justice Alito holds that limited view of the 
importance of history. Indeed, by invoking Town of Greece to explain his American 
Legion decision, he suggested that history can justify new religious monuments and 
practices that conform to old traditions.189 
As I have noted, Justice Kagan refused to join subpart D of Justice Alito’s 
opinion because she did not want “to sign on to any broader statements about 
history’s role in Establishment Clause analysis.”190 And Justice Breyer, reflecting a 
similar unease, explained in his concurrence how we should read Justice Alito’s 
opinion: “Nor do I understand the Court’s opinion today to adopt a ‘history and 
tradition test’ that would permit any newly constructed religious memorial on public 
                                                                                                     
186 American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2091 (Breyer & Kagan, JJ., concurring) (quoting the majority 
opinion, 125 S. Ct. at 2854). 
187 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
188 American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2085. 
189 Id. at 2087–89 (citing Town of Greece’s holding that the town’s relatively new prayer practice 
was constitutional because it “[f]it within the tradition long followed in Congress and the state 
legislatures”). 
190 Id. at 2094 (Kagan, J., concurring in part). 
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land.”191 There are the seeds of future controversy in these statements of concern 
about Justice Alito’s use of history. 
My second source of concern is Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence. Unlike most of 
his colleagues, who seemed to recognize the difficulty and sensitivity of the Cross 
case,192 Justice Gorsuch failed to acknowledge the religious diversity of this country. 
In a challenge to the well-established theory of “offended observer” standing193 in 
Establishment Clause cases, he belittled—with the pointed use of scare quotes—the 
objections of the members of the American Humanist Association who “regularly” 
come into “unwelcome direct contact” with the Cross “while driving in the area.”194 
He saw their objections as symptomatic of a greater problem: 
In a large and diverse country, offense can be easily found. Really, most every 
governmental action probably offends somebody. No doubt, too, that offense can be 
sincere, sometimes well taken, even wise. But recourse for disagreement and offense 
does not lie in federal litigation.195 
Echoing Town of Greece, where Justice Kennedy said that attendees at council 
meetings offended by the opening prayers could leave the room, Justice Gorsuch said 
that an “offended viewer” may “avert his eyes.”196 Given that the offended observers 
in these passive-symbol cases are almost always religious minorities, Justice 
Gorsuch’s admonition that they just look away betrayed insensitivity to their 
concerns. 
Equally disquieting is his zeal to dismantle Lemon, which led him to assert that 
“not a single Member of the Court even tries to defend Lemon against these 
criticisms,”197 thereby dismissing the significance of Justice Kagan’s embrace of 
Lemon in her concurrence and Justice Ginsburg’s application of Lemon in her 
dissent. And I have already noted Justice Gorsuch’s strange message to lower court 
judges that they should ignore any suggestion in the majority opinion that the new 
presumption of constitutionality should be limited to old monuments.198 
                                                                                                     
191 Id. at 2091 (Breyer & Kagan, JJ., concurring). 
192 Justice Kavanaugh, at the end of his concurrence, offered an unusual consoling note to the losing 
plaintiffs: 
I have deep respect for the plaintiffs’ sincere objections to seeing the cross on public land. 
I have great respect for the Jewish war veterans who in an amicus brief say that the cross 
on public land sends a message of exclusion. I recognize their sense of distress and 
alienation.  
Id. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Hence, he said, “[i]t is appropriate to. . . restate this bedrock 
constitutional principle. All citizens are equally American, no matter what religion they are, or if they 
have no religion at all.” Id. at 2094. 
193 Id. at 2098 (Gorsuch & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 2103. For a defense of observer standing, see Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in 
support of Respondents at *4–*5, Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (No. 
17-1717), 2019 WL 582080 (drawing on Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (concerning prayer 
at public high school graduation and finding that student had standing because she would hear—
regardless of whether she would be forced to participate in—the prayer at graduation)). 
196 American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2103 (Gorsuch & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment) 
(citation omitted). 
197 Id. at 2101 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
198 See text accompanying note 173, supra. 
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Finally, Justice Gorsuch did not conceal his contempt for the passive-symbol 
litigation that he attributes to Lemon. By discarding Lemon and offended-observer 
standing, he wanted to save “the federal judiciary from the sordid business of having 
to pass aesthetic judgment, one by one, on every public display in this country for its 
perceived capacity to give offense.”199 With the Establishment Clause thus 
diminished (the ardent desire of the accommodation advocates), there would be more 
room for a dominant religion in the public square. That prospect, rather than the 
specific outcome of American Legion, makes the case a troubling harbinger if Justice 
Gorsuch wins more allies for his views.200 
VI. CONCLUSION 
I began this essay by observing that there are two competing visions on the 
Supreme Court about the proper relationship between the government and religion 
under our Constitution—accommodation and separation. Although that remains true 
after American Legion, the separation vision is steadily losing ground, with Justices 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor its only remaining adherents. Justice Breyer and Justice 
Kagan reflected elements of both visions in their American Legion opinions, with a 
decided accommodation tilt. Even without them, the accommodation advocates now 
have five sympathetic justices in their camp with the arrival of Justice Kavanaugh. 
Hence, these advocates will continue to pursue their two most cherished goals: 
overturning Smith and Lemon. In their view, overruling the former will dramatically 
increase the presence of religion in the public square under the Free Exercise Clause, 
and overruling the latter will do so under the Establishment Clause. The outcomes in 
Town of Greece and American Legion provide a preview of the beneficiaries of that 
shift in Establishment Clause jurisprudence—Christian denominations with their 
grounding in the early history of this country. Arguably, using the challenge to public 
                                                                                                     
199 American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2103 (Gorsuch & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment). 
Would those public displays include a Latin cross on the roof of city hall during the Christmas 
season or during the forty days of Lent? This very question arose between the Justices in a 1989 
passive-symbol case involving the constitutionality of a crèche and a menorah in public buildings 
in Pittsburgh. In that case, the Court found the placement of the crèche unconstitutional and the 
placement of the menorah constitutional. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601–02, 20–21. That 
outcome prompted an exchange between Justice Kennedy and Justice Blackmun. In his concurring 
and dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy stated that he thought that the Establishment Clause 
“forbids a city to permit the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall.” Id. 
at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Citing Justice 
Kennedy’s use of the word “permanent,” Justice Blackmun asked in his majority opinion, “for 
Justice Kennedy, would it be enough of a preference for Christianity if that city each year displayed 
a crèche for 40 days during the Christmas season and a cross for 40 days during Lent (and never the 
symbols of other religions)?” Id. at 607 (Blackmun, J.). Although Justice Kennedy did not answer 
the question in that case, it is now clear how Justice Gorsuch would answer. Given his views on 
offended-observer standing, he would say that anyone offended by the cross should not be allowed 
to seek relief in court, thereby sparing the courts from that “sordid business” of passing aesthetic 
judgment on it. American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2103. Instead, they should address their concerns to 
the city council. Id. 
200 Implicitly, seven of the justices rejected Justice Gorsuch's views on offended-observer standing 
by reaching the merits of American Legion. At least on that issue, his only ally may be Justice 
Thomas. He has much more support for his zeal to dismantle Lemon, with implications far beyond 
these passive-symbol cases. 
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accommodation laws in Masterpiece Cakeshop as a guide, overturning Smith might 
have the same effect in free exercise jurisprudence. The Masterpiece baker grounded 
his objection to same-sex marriage in his understanding of Christian teaching that 
“marriage is a sacred union between one man and one woman, and that it represents 
the relationship of Jesus Christ and His Church.”201 
Of course, opponents of same-sex marriage might base their religious objections 
on a faith other than Christianity. In that sense overturning Smith might promote 
religious diversity in a way that overturning Lemon would not. When Smith was first 
decided, it was criticized as a threat to religious diversity and the protection of 
minority religion.202 That criticism continues.203 Indeed, there is a consensus in 
church/state jurisprudence that the Religion Clauses “aim to protect minorities in 
religious matters” against the majority generally and the politically accountable 
branches specifically.204 Smith runs counter to that purpose. 
Although I have no settled view on the wisdom of overturning Smith, I do think 
that there are reasons for caution. Smith operates in the realm of neutral laws of 
general applicability. As both Masterpiece Cakeshop and Trinity Lutheran show, the 
requirement of neutrality is not meaningless. Also, as Justice Scalia said in Smith, 
Values that are protected against government interference through enshrinement in 
the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political process. Just as a 
society that believes in the negative protection accorded to the press by the First 
Amendment is likely to enact laws that affirmatively foster the dissemination of the 
printed word, so also a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to 
religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as 
well.205 
Both the federal and state RFRAs confirm Justice Scalia’s observation.206 With 
their incorporation of the Sherbert balancing tests, they reflect solicitude for minority 
religious beliefs and practices.207 And the Court created a firestorm when it 
                                                                                                     
201 Masterpiece Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 51, 2017 WL 3913762, at *9. It is important to note, 
however, that there is no single view in Christianity about the rightfulness of same-sex marriage. In 
fact, a majority of Christians in the United States said in 2015 that same-sex relationships “should 
be accepted by society,” with fifty-four percent of Protestants and seventy percent of Catholics 
sharing that view. Caryle Murphy, Most U.S. Christian Groups Grow More Accepting of 
Homosexuality, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/12/18/most-u-s-christian-groups-grow-more-accepting-of-homosexuality/. By contrast, 
only thirty-six percent of evangelical Protestants believe that same-sex relationships “should be 
accepted.” Id. 
202 See note 15, supra. 
203 See, e.g., Stephanie H. Barclay & Mark L. Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or As-Applied 
Challenges? A Defense of Religious Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1595 (2018). 
204 Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 919, 924 
(2004). 
205 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
206 See supra pp. 329-30. 
207 Cf. Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 
1470 (1999) (presenting the view that the constitutional rule of Smith combined with federal and 
state RFRAs offers the ideal balance between protecting “the political process” and protecting 
minority religious practitioners against “the mechanical application of rules that were designed 
without any thought about religious objectors”). 
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essentially overturned the Sherbert balancing test in Smith.208 There is a cautionary 
tale in that firestorm. Stability in the law is an important value. 
As for Lemon, it does not deserve the derision heaped upon it. Writing for the 
Court in Lemon, Chief Justice Burger said that the Court “gleaned” its three-part test 
by “consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many 
years.”209 That distilled wisdom should not be jettisoned just because Lemon 
incorporates separation values that frustrate accommodation advocates. To be sure, 
as the critics of Lemon demonstrate in American Legion, the Court has ignored 
Lemon in many subsequent Establishment Clause cases.210 That divergence bespeaks 
the futility of attempting to use any single test for resolving every Establishment 
Clause case. Yet, as Justice Kagan intimated in American Legion, Lemon may remain 
useful for analyzing cases in which the accommodation costs are high—for example, 
if there is a demand for a new religious monument, arguably grounded in tradition, 
in a public building or park.211 
Of course, if Smith and Lemon are to go, the Supreme Court will have to do it in 
future cases. Meanwhile, with the free exercise issues raised by Masterpiece 
Cakeshop still unresolved, the free exercise implications of Trinity Lutheran 
unexplored, and the scope of the presumption of constitutionality for religious 
monuments or practices uncertain, there will be plenty of work for the lower courts 
in these difficult church/state cases. As these cases play out, I hope 
accommodationist critics of outcomes that disappoint them will stop suggesting that 
any reliance by judges on separationist values in their opinions reflects “an implicit 
disdain for the religious world view.”212 
In her dissent in Trinity Lutheran, Justice Sotomayor anticipated and responded 
to this unfair conflation of the separation vision with hostility to religion generally: 
                                                                                                     
208 See supra pp. 329-30. 
209 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612; see also text accompanying notes 86–89, supra. 
210 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002) (upholding school voucher 
program without using Lemon test); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001) 
(ignoring Lemon test in holding that allowing religious groups that offer after-school activities to 
use school facilities does not violate Establishment Clause). 
211 I recognize that preserving the Lemon test for occasional use evokes Justice Scalia’s famous 
metaphor that the Lemon test “stalks [the Supreme Court’s] Establishment Clause jurisprudence” 
like “some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave” whenever its use 
supports the desired outcome. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 
398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). For Justice Scalia, such occasional use was anathema because 
he subscribed to a narrow view of the Establishment Clause that bars only coercion “by force of 
law and threat of penalty.” Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis in original). However, I disagree with that narrow view of the Establishment Clause, and 
so I am untroubled by the prospect of invoking Lemon under appropriate circumstances. See infra 
at pp. 361–62. 
212 Mark Fischer, The Sacred and the Secular: An Examination of the “Wall of Separation” and Its 
Impact on the Religious World View, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 325, 340 (1992); see also RICHARD J. 
NEUHAUS, AMERICAN BABYLON: NOTES OF A CHRISTIAN EXILE 204 (2009) (describing those who 
hold to the separation vision as “methodological atheists” who believe that “[o]nly those arguments 
are to be admitted to public deliberation that proceed as if God did not exist”). For more extreme 
variations on this theme, see Ann Coulter’s Godless: The Church of Liberalism (2006), John 
Gibson’s The War on Christmas (2005), and David Limbaugh’s Persecution: How Liberals are 
Waging War Against Christianity (2003). 
360 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2 
A State’s decision not to fund houses of worship does not disfavor religion; rather, 
it represents a valid choice to remain secular in the face of serious establishment and 
free exercise concerns. That does not make the State “atheistic or antireligious.”213 
Indeed, as Justice Sotomayor saw it, her strict separation view strengthens religion, 
for “[h]istory shows that the Religion Clauses separate the public treasury from 
religious coffers as one measure to secure the kind of freedom of conscience that 
benefits both religion and government.”214 There can be good faith debate about this 
proposition. There is no justification, however, for equating its wariness about the 
role of religion in the public square with religious animus. 
Thus, an anti-discrimination law that is neutral about religion could 
appropriately be applied in a future case like Masterpiece Cakeshop to reject the free 
exercise claim of a reluctant baker. The demand for a religious exception from 
neutral laws is based upon a perceived conflict between their requirements and the 
right to worship freely. Judges would have to weigh the baker’s interest in receiving 
an exemption to exercise a particular religious view against competing 
considerations—the right to express that religious view in the home, houses of 
worship, and many public places; the free choice made by those who pursue 
businesses regulated by anti-discrimination laws; and the vital protection afforded 
members of minority groups of all kinds by anti-discrimination laws. Treating the 
free exercise of religion in the conduct of business as one competing value in that 
assessment, and deeming it to be less weighty than others in a particular case, would 
reflect due consideration of all worthy values, not hostility to religion. 
And if Justice Kagan’s dissent in Town of Greece had been the majority opinion, 
that decision would not have reflected hostility to religion. As she pointed out, town 
council meetings need not be “religion-free zones.”215 They need only be zones in 
which the religious diversity of the wider community is honored, not ignored. There 
is no disparagement of religion in that insistence.  
    Or, in a sequel to Trinity Lutheran, if government excludes religious 
organizations from a government grant program, and the subject matter of that grant 
program is so close to the core of religious worship that the “play in the joints” 
between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause favors the 
Establishment Clause, that difficult judgment would not betray hostility to religion. 
Rather, it would reflect a weighing of the competing values cited by Justice Breyer 
in his Van Orden concurrence. As he put it, the concerns of the Lemon test with 
government’s “excessive interference with, or promotion of, religion” and 
“excessive government entanglement with religion” still have force.216 That 
recognition does not belittle religion. 
As I have already noted, I admire Justice Breyer’s Van Orden methodology, so 
prevalent in his American Legion concurrence.217 Although he had “hostility to 
religion” very much on his mind in Van Orden, he was not worried that Court 
observers would unfairly criticize the Justices. Rather, he worried that the Court, in 
                                                                                                     
213 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2040 (Sotomayor & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
214 Id. at 2041. 
215 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 616 (Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting). 
216 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 703. 
217 See text accompanying notes 185–87, supra. 
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making its decision about the constitutionality of the Ten Commandments display 
on the Texas capital grounds, might not sufficiently appreciate that hostility to 
religion was a concern at the core of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.218 
After looking at the totality of the circumstances in that case—the physical 
structure of the granite monument, its donation by a “private civic (and primarily 
secular) organization,” its forty-year presence on the capital grounds without legal 
objection, and its physical setting, Justice Breyer concluded that the circumstances 
suggested that the state intended to convey a moral and secular message instead of a 
religious message with its Ten Commandments monument, and that the display 
would be so perceived by the public.219 To order the removal of the Ten 
Commandments because of the religious nature of the tablets’ text would, in those 
circumstances, exhibit a hostility toward religion that has no place in our 
Establishment Clause traditions. Such a holding might well encourage disputes 
concerning the removal of longstanding depictions of the Ten Commandments from 
public buildings across the Nation. And it could thereby create the very kind of 
religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.220 
This attention to consequences in Van Orden is not surprising, as Justice Breyer 
has long emphasized that judges should consider such consequences in applying 
statutes or the Constitution. “Since law is connected to life,” he has written, “judges, 
in applying a text in light of its purpose, should look to consequences, including 
‘contemporary conditions, social, industrial, and political, of the community to be 
affected.’”221 This attention to consequences, in turn, provides “an important 
yardstick to measure a given interpretation’s faithfulness to . . . democratic 
purposes” and enables a judge to assess whether it is “consistent with the people’s 
will.”222 
Although this language may seem too mystical to help judges decide actual 
cases, that is not so. Historians are adept at discerning purposes in historical events, 
such as the writing and ratification of the Bill of Rights, and judges use that history 
in their opinions. Drawing on these sources in Van Orden, Justice Breyer recounted 
the basic purposes of the Religion Clauses: to “assure the fullest possible scope of 
religious liberty and tolerance for all”;223 to avoid “divisiveness based upon religion 
that promotes social conflict, sapping the strength of government and religion 
alike”;224 and to maintain the “separation of church and state” that has long been 
critical to the “peaceful dominion that religion exercises in [this] country,” where the 
“spirit of religion” and the “spirit of freedom” are productively “united,” “reign[ing] 
                                                                                                     
218 See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699 (expressing concern that “untutored devotion to the concept of 
neutrality can lead to invocation or approval of results which partake not simply of that 
noninterference and noninvolvement with the religious which the Constitution commands, but of a 
brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the 
religious” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
219 Id. at 701–04. 
220 Id. at 704 (citation omitted). 
221 STEPHEN J. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 18 (2005). 
222 Id. at 115. 
223 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Sch. Dist. of 
Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (Goldberg & Harlan, JJ., concurring)). 
224 Id. 
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together” but in separate spheres “on the same soil.”225 
These purposes, in turn, reveal that “the relation between government and 
religion is one of separation, but not of mutual hostility and suspicion.”226 There must 
be room for religion in the public square without the excessive entanglement that 
compromises both government and religion. 
Do these recognitions of purpose offer judges a self-executing guide to deciding 
church/state cases? Of course not. They simply inform, as Justice Breyer put it, the 
need for the “exercise of legal judgment” in those inescapable “borderline cases.”227 
And, importantly, they do what all principles or purposes or standards do for 
judges—they provide a framework for assessing the significance of the facts in the 
dispute before them. In Van Orden, Justice Breyer looked at those facts (“the totality 
of the circumstances”), and, in light of his understanding of the purposes of the 
Establishment Clause, drawn from history and Supreme Court precedent, concluded 
that the Ten Commandments display on the Texas capital grounds should remain in 
place.228 
I realize that this model of decision making, grounded in constitutional purposes 
and values, applied to the vast variety of facts in church/state cases, creates an 
unwelcome unpredictability for those who seek to eliminate the messiness of 
church/state jurisprudence with bright line rules, a unifying theory of the Religion 
Clauses, or a single-factor analysis—an impossible enterprise. Church/state 
jurisprudence is inescapably messy because, as the Justices themselves have 
recognized, there is “no simple and clear measure which by precise application can 
readily and invariably demark the permissible from the impermissible.”229 In short, 
the church/state puzzle will always remain a puzzle. But judges still have to decide 
cases. To that end, Justice Breyer’s purpose-driven, multi-factor approach provides 
the best hope for sensible outcomes faithful to the intent of the Religion Clauses. 
VII. POSTSCRIPT 
 On June 30, 2020, the Supreme Court issued a major church/state decision, 
Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue,230 a sequel to the Trinity Lutheran 
                                                                                                     
225 Id. (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 282–83 (1835) (H. Mansfield & 
D. Winthrop trans. & eds. 2000)). Justice Breyer’s concerns about allaying divisiveness have a solid 
grounding in history. 
226 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700. 
227 Id. 
228 I am not alone in my admiration of Justice Breyer’s Van Orden concurrence. See Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., A Salute to Justice Breyer’s Concurring Opinion in Van Orden v. Perry, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 429, 433 (2014) (“[Justice Breyer’s] method seems to me to have been exemplary. . . . [H]e 
interpreted the Establishment Clause as requiring fine line drawing to avoid acutely divisive rulings 
that would achieve too little good under at least some circumstances. My hat comes off to Justice 
Breyer’s Van Orden opinion for candidly shouldering the responsibility that goes with a conception 
of the judicial role in which good judging requires good judgment.”) 
229 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Abington, 374 
U.S. at 306 (Goldberg & Harlan, JJ., concurring)). 
230 591 U.S. ___, No. 18-1195, 2020 WL 3518364 (June 30, 2020). 
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decision discussed above.231  I said at the end of that discussion that “the sequel to 
Trinity Lutheran will be divisive and portentous.”232  I was right.233 
 Written by Chief Justice Roberts for a five-member majority, the decision 
significantly increases the possibilities for government aid for religious schools.  To 
be sure, as Chief Justice Roberts notes in his decision, the Supreme Court has 
previously ruled that state government programs providing aid to religious 
organizations are compatible with the Establishment Clause.234  Those programs 
have included vouchers, tax credits, and secular textbooks for religious schools.235  
The Establishment Clause long ago ceased to be a barrier to such programs.  
However, as a matter of Establishment Clause policy, many states have 
constitutional or statutory provisions barring or limiting government aid to religious 
institutions or schools in far more sweeping terms than the playground grant 
program, with its exclusion for churches and other religious organizations, found 
unconstitutional on Free Exercise grounds in Trinity Lutheran.236  In Espinoza, the 
Court applied the Free Exercise rationale of Trinity Lutheran to one of those 
sweeping no-aid provisions.  To do so, the Court had to overcome the constraints of 
a precedent, Locke v. Davey.237  To understand Espinoza, we must begin with that 
precedent.   
A.  Locke v. Davey 
 The State of Washington established a Promise Scholarship Program, funded 
                                                                                                     
231 Espinoza was issued just days before this volume of the Law Review was to be published.  I appreciate 
the willingness of the editors to delay publication so that I could write this postscript.  
232 See supra p. 341. 
233 On July 8, 2020, the Supreme Court issued two more important church/state decisions.  The first, Little 
Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, involved the application of the RFRA.  
591 U.S. ___, No. 19-431, 2020 WL 3808424, at *3-5 (July 8, 2020).  It was a sequel to two earlier cases: 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014), and Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).  
I have already indicated that I am not dealing with the RFRA cases in this essay.  See supra note 5.  The 
second case, Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, involved the application of the 
"ministerial exception" to employment discrimination claims brought by two elementary school teachers 
at Catholic schools.  591 U.S. ___, No. 19-267, 2020 WL 3808420, at *3 (July 8, 2020).  The "ministerial 
exception" line of cases is also beyond the scope of this essay.   
234 See Espinoza, 2020 WL 3518364, at *5 ("We have repeatedly held that the Establishment Clause is 
not offended when religious observers and organizations benefit from neutral government programs."). 
235 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (vouchers); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S 388 (1983) 
(tax credits); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) 
(textbooks).   
236 Forty-eight states have constitutional provisions restricting government funding of religious activity.  
See Steven Green, Symposium: RIP State "Blaine Amendments" -- Espinoza and the "No-Aid" Principle, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2020), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/06/ 
symposium-rip-state-blaine-amendments-espinoza-and-the-no-aid-principle/.  Of those forty-eight states, 
twenty-nine contain "no-compelled support" clauses, modeled on Pennsylvania's constitution of 1776, 
which stated that no person could be "compelled  to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to 
maintain any ministry against his consent"; twenty-seven restrict "public appropriations" to "public 
purposes" or for "public use";  and thirty-eight contain "no-aid clauses," which bar the spending of public 
funds for religious institutions or religious education.  Id.  See also supra note 57. 
237 540 U.S. 712 (2004).  
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through the State's general fund, to assist academically gifted students with post-
secondary education expenses.  However, scholarship recipients were precluded by 
statute from pursuing a degree in “devotional theology” at eligible post-secondary 
institutions.238  Although a “degree in theology” was not defined in the statute, the 
parties acknowledged that the statute codified the state's constitutional prohibition 
against providing funds to students to pursue degrees that are “devotional in nature 
or designed to induce religious faith.”239 
 After Joshua Davey was awarded a Promise Scholarship, he chose to attend 
Northwest College, a private Christian college affiliated with the Assemblies of God 
denomination.240  Davey decided to pursue a double major in pastoral ministries and 
business management/administration.  There was no dispute that the pastoral 
ministries degree, devotional in nature, was excluded under the Promise Scholarship 
program.  Thus, Northwest College informed Davey that he could not use his 
scholarship funds to pursue his pastoral ministries degree. 
 In response, Davey filed a civil rights action claiming, among other things, that 
his inability to use the scholarship to pursue a theology degree violated the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  Davey lost his case in the district court, 
but he won before a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit, which first held that 
Washington had singled out religion for unfavorable treatment, and thus, pursuant to 
the Supreme Court's decision in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v Hialeah, the 
state scholarship program's exclusion of theology majors was presumptively 
unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny.241  Then, finding that Washington's 
establishment of religion concerns were not compelling enough to overcome the 
Promise Scholarship program's presumptively unconstitutional nature, the panel in 
Locke declared the program unconstitutional on free exercise grounds.242 
 Writing for a seven-member majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist began his 
review of this decision with two propositions central to his analysis.  First, he 
                                                                                                     
238 Id. at 715. 
239 Id. at 716.  The Washington constitutional provision read, in relevant part: "No public money or 
property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the 
support of any religious establishment."  Wash. Const. art. I, § 11.  Although the "devotional in nature" 
language did not appear in the constitutional provision itself, the State Attorney General had long ascribed 
that meaning to the provision, and both the parties and the Supreme Court accepted it.  See Locke, 540 
U.S. at 716 (citing both the Petitioners' and Respondent's briefs, which in turn cited several Washington 
Attorney General opinions).  
240 In 2005, Northwest College changed its name to Northwest University.  See Over 80 Years of 
Excellence, NORTHWEST UNIVERSITY, https://www.northwestu.edu/about/history/ (last visited July 13, 
2020).  It was still known as Northwest College at the time that Davey sought to use his Promise 
Scholarship there. 
241 Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 757-58 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).  In Church of 
Lukumi, the Court had assessed the constitutionality of a Hialeah, Florida ordinance which made it a crime 
to engage in the ritual sacrifice of animals.  508 U.S. 520, 523-26 (1993).  The ordinance had been enacted 
in the wake of the establishment of the petitioner church in Hialeah, and the Court found that it was 
specifically targeted at the Santeria faith of that church.  Id. at 535.  The Court struck down the ordinance 
as violating the Free Exercise Clause.  Id. at 547.  Specifically, it held that the ordinance was 
presumptively unconstitutional because it was not neutral with respect to religion and was not justified by 
a compelling government interest and narrowly tailored to advance that interest.  Id. at 533-47. 
242 Locke, 299 F.3d at 760. 
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invoked the concept often found in these church/state cases -- the “play in the joints” 
between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.243  “In other words,” 
the Chief Justice explained, “there are some state actions permitted by the 
Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.”244  He also noted 
that “the link between government funds and religious training is broken by the 
independent and private choice of recipients.”245  Under Establishment Clause 
precedent, that break diminished Establishment Clause concerns.  Hence, there was 
“no doubt,” said Chief Justice Rehnquist, that the state could permit Promise 
Scholars to pursue a degree in devotional theology without violating the 
Establishment Clause.246  Instead, the central question in the case was whether 
Washington could deny funding for the pursuit of a degree in devotional theology 
without violating the Free Exercise Clause. 
 In answering that question, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the applicability 
of the rule enunciated in the Church of Lukumi case -- a state program is 
presumptively unconstitutional if it is not facially neutral with respect to religion.247  
As he saw it, “the state's disfavor of religion (if it can be called that) is of a far milder 
kind” than in Lukumi, where the city made it a crime to engage in certain kinds of 
animal slaughter required by the church.248  Washington did not impose criminal or 
civil sanctions on any type of religious service or rite.249  Ministers were not denied 
the right to participate in the political affairs of the community, and the state did “not 
require students to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a government 
benefit” since Promise Scholars could still use their scholarship “to attend 
pervasively religious schools, so long as they are accredited.”250  The state merely 
“chose[] not to fund a distinct category of instruction.”251 
 Importantly, said the Chief Justice, that choice was “not evidence of hostility 
toward religion.”252  Instead, the state's decision to exclude theological studies from 
state financial support was consistent with a particular objection, solidly grounded 
in colonial history, to the use of “taxpayer funds to support church leaders.”253  
                                                                                                     
243 Locke, 540 U.S. at 718.  See supra note 58. 
244 Locke, 540 U.S. at 718-19. 
245 Id. at 719. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 720.   
248 Id.  
249 Id. 
250 Id. at 720-21, 724.  
251 Id. at 721. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. at 722.  The Chief Justice described one of the most famous historical examples of public backlash 
against the use of taxpayer funds to support church leaders.  A bill entitled "A Bill Establishing A 
Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion" was introduced in the Virginia Legislature and defeated 
after it caused a public outcry.  Id. at 723 n.6.  Instead, the Virginia Legislature enacted a bill originally 
drafted by Thomas Jefferson entitled the "Virginia bill for Religious Liberty," which guaranteed "that no 
man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever."  Id. 
(quoting A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, reprinted in 2 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 546 
(J. Boyd ed. 1950)). 
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Indeed, said the Chief Justice, “[w]e can think of  few areas in which a State's 
antiestablishment interests come more into play.”254 
 To further separate Washington's constitutional provision from any animus 
toward religion, Chief Justice Rehnquist said that Washington's constitutional 
provision, given its drafting and adoption history, was not an anti-Catholic Blaine 
Amendment, a reference to the unsuccessful effort of Congressman James Blaine of 
Maine in 1875 to add language to the First Amendment barring aid to “sectarian” 
schools, where “it was an open secret that 'sectarian' was code for 'Catholic.'“255  
Thus, according to the Chief Justice, “the Blaine Amendment's history is simply not 
before us.”256   Moreover, drawing again on history, the Chief Justice quoted colonial 
charters that valued religion by seeking to protect its free exercise from state 
compulsion:   
All persons shall have the free exercise of religion, without being obliged to 
contribute to the support of any religious profession but their own.257 
 
* * * 
[N]o man ought or of right can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or 
erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or 
against, his own free will and consent.258 
Given this history and the specifics of the Promise Scholarship Program, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist summarized the position of the Court: 
We find neither in the history or text of Article I, § 11, of the Washington 
Constitution, nor in the operation of the Promise Scholarship Program, anything that 
suggests animus toward religion. . . . The State's interest in not funding the pursuit 
of devotional degrees is substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a 
relatively minor burden on Promise Scholars.  If any room exists between the two 
Religious Clauses, it must be here.259 
B.  Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue 
 The Montana constitutional provision at issue in Espinoza is broader than the 
provision at issue in Locke.  Whereas the provision in Locke proscribed only the grant 
of state funds “to students to pursue degrees that are devotional in nature or designed 
to induce religious faith,”260 the Montana provision barred government aid to 
                                                                                                     
254 Id. at 722. 
255 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (plurality opinion).  See supra note 57 for more details 
on the history of the phrase "Blaine Amendment" and its anti-Catholic origins. 
256 Locke, 540 U.S. at 723 n.7.   
257 Id. at 723 (quoting Ga. Const., art. IV, § 5 (1789), reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 789 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) (reprinted 1993)). 
258 Id. (quoting Pa. Const., art. II (1776), reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL 
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 3082 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) (reprinted 1993)). 
259 Id. at 725. 
260 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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sectarian schools generally.261  That broad prohibition provided the backdrop for the 
Espinoza litigation. 
 In 2015, the Montana legislature enacted a scholarship program for students 
attending private schools “to provide parental and student choice in education.”262  
The program granted a tax credit to any taxpayer who donated to a participating 
“student scholarship organization,”  and the scholarship organizations then used the 
donations to award scholarships to children for tuition at private schools.263  
Beginning in 2016, the Montana legislature allotted $3 million per year to fund the 
tax credits.264  A family whose child was awarded a scholarship under the program 
could use it at any “qualified education provider,” defined in the statute as any private 
school that met certain accreditation, testing, and safety requirements.265  By its 
terms, the statute did not exclude sectarian schools from the scholarship program.  
However, the statute directed that it be administered in accordance with Article X, 
section 6 of the Montana Constitution, which contains the “no-aid” provision barring 
government aid to sectarian schools.266  Hence, the Montana Department of Revenue 
issued “Rule 1,” a regulation implementing the scholarship program that changed the 
statutory definition of a “qualified education provider” to exclude any school “owned 
or controlled in whole or in part by any church, religious sect, or denomination.”267 
 Three mothers whose children attended the Stillwater Christian School filed a 
lawsuit against the Department of Revenue in state court challenging their exclusion 
from the Big Sky scholarship program, the only scholarship organization 
participating in the state program.  They were successful in the trial court, which 
issued an injunction permitting Big Sky to award scholarships to students regardless 
of whether they attended a religious or secular school.268  The Montana Supreme 
Court then reversed the trial court.  As an initial matter, it held that the scholarship 
program violated the Montana Constitution's no-aid provision because it made 
scholarships available for use at sectarian schools.269  It then held that Rule 1 was 
                                                                                                     
261 Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, 591 U.S. ___, No. 18-1195, 2020 WL 3518364, at *3 (June 30, 
2020).  Montana's no-aid provision reads, in relevant part: "The legislature, counties, cities, towns, school 
districts, and public corporations shall not make any direct or indirect appropriation or payment from any 
public fund or monies, or any grant of lands or other property . . . to aid any church, school, academy, 
seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific institution, controlled in whole or in part by 
any church, sect, or denomination."  Mont. Const., art. X, § 6(1). 
262 Espinoza, 2020 WL 3518364, at *2 (quoting 2015 Mont. Laws p. 2168, § 7). 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at *3. 
265 Id. (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 15–30–3102(7)). 
266 See Mont. Code Ann. § 15-30-3101 ("The tax credit for taxpayer donations under this part must be 
administered in compliance with . . . Article X, section 6, of the Montana constitution."). 
267 Mont. Admin. Rule § 42.4.802(1)(a) (2015). 
268 The trial court concluded that the Montana constitutional provision prohibited only "appropriations 
that aid religious schools," not tax credits.  See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, No. DV-15-1152C, 
2017 WL 11317587, at *3-4 (Mont. Dist. May 23, 2017). 
269 Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, 613-14 (Mont. 2018).  As the Montana Supreme 
Court put it: "The Legislature, by enacting a statute that provides a dollar-for-dollar credit against taxes 
owed to the state, is the entity providing aid to sectarian schools via tax credits in violation of Article X, 
Section 6."  Id. at 612. 
368 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2 
superfluous, given the scholarship program's unconstitutionality as a matter of state 
law, and ultra vires, given that it materially altered the definition of “qualified 
education provider” provided by the statute that it was meant to implement.270  While 
recognizing that the Montana legislature had granted broad authority to the 
Department of Revenue to issue regulations to implement the scholarship program 
consistent with the Montana Constitution, the Montana Supreme Court concluded 
that “[a]n agency cannot transform an unconstitutional statute into a constitutional 
statute with an administrative rule.  It is the Legislature’s responsibility to craft 
statutes in compliance with Montana’s Constitution, which it failed to do here.”271  
In other words, Rule 1 could not save the scholarship-program statute from violating 
the Montana Constitution's no-aid provision.  Concluding that the program provided 
no mechanism for preventing aid from flowing to religious schools, the Montana 
Supreme Court invalidated the entire scholarship program.272  Hence, a tax credit is 
no longer available to support scholarships at either religious or secular private 
schools. 
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Free Exercise 
Clause precluded the Montana Supreme Court from applying Montana's no-aid 
provision to bar religious schools from the scholarship program. 
1.  The Majority Opinion of Chief Justice Roberts 
 Writing for a five-member majority, the Chief Justice begins his opinion where 
he began his Trinity Lutheran decision, and where Chief Justice Rehnquist began his 
Locke decision -- invoking the concept of “play in the joints” between the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.273  But the Chiefs have different 
“play” in mind.  Chief Justice Rehnquist said in Locke that “[t]here are some state 
actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise 
Clause.”274  Chief Justice Roberts says in Espinoza that there is “'play in the joints' 
between what the Establishment Clause permits and the Free Exercise Clause 
compels.”275 
 After explaining that a state's scholarship program providing aid for both 
secular and sectarian schools does not violate the Establishment Clause,276 Chief 
Justice Roberts demonstrates that his reasoning in Trinity Lutheran carefully set the 
                                                                                                     
270 Id. at 614-15.   
271 Id. at 615. 
272 Id. at 613-15.   
273 See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, 591 U.S. ___, No. 18-1195, 2020 WL 3518364, at *5 (June 
30, 2020).   
274 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004). 
275 Espinoza, 2020 WL 3518364, at *5 (quoting Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 
137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2017)). 
276 The Chief Justice explains that the program does not violate the Establishment Clause because "the 
Establishment Clause is not offended when religious observers and organizations benefit from neutral 
government programs."  Id.  He also adds that a challenge to the scholarship program based on the 
Establishment Clause would be "particularly unavailing because the government support makes its way 
to religious schools only as a result of Montanans independently choosing to spend their scholarships at 
such schools."  Id. 
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stage for his free-exercise analysis in Espinoza: 
Trinity Lutheran distilled [a number of precedents] into the “unremarkable” 
conclusion that disqualifying other eligible recipients from a public benefit “solely 
because of their religious character” imposes “a penalty on the free exercise of 
religion that triggers the most exacting scrutiny.”  In Trinity Lutheran, Missouri 
provided grants to help nonprofit organizations pay for playground resurfacing, but 
a state policy disqualified any organization “owned or controlled by a church, sect, 
or other religious entity.”  Because of that policy, an otherwise eligible church-
owned preschool was denied a grant to resurface its playground.  Missouri's policy 
discriminated against the Church “simply because of what it is -- a church,” and so 
the policy was subject to the “strictest scrutiny,” which it failed. . . .  Here too 
Montana's no-aid provision bars religious schools from public benefits solely 
because of the religious character of the schools.277 
 Having highlighted that the religious character of the schools is the basis for 
their exclusion from public benefit programs, the Chief Justice draws the distinction 
at the core of his free exercise analysis: “This case . . . turns expressly on religious 
status and not religious use.”278  In an attempt to dissuade the Chief from adopting 
that distinction, Montana had argued that the status/use distinction is unworkable.  
As evidence, Montana contrasted the “'completely non-religious benefit' of 
playground resurfacing in Trinity Lutheran with the unrestricted tuition aid at issue” 
in Espinoza.279  “General school aid,” Montana said, could be used for religious ends 
by some recipients, particularly schools that believe faith should “permeate 
everything they do.”280  The Chief Justice responds that such considerations were not 
the basis for the Montana Supreme Court's decision, which “hinged solely on 
religious status.”281  And “[s]tatus-based discrimination remains status based even if 
one of its goals or effects is preventing religious organizations from putting aid to 
religious uses.”282 
 Justice Gorsuch also expresses skepticism about the wisdom of the status/use 
distinction in a concurring opinion: 
[A]ny jurisprudence grounded on a status-use distinction seems destined to yield 
more questions than answers. Does Montana seek to prevent religious parents and 
schools from participating in a public benefits program (status)? Or does the State 
aim to bar public benefits from being employed to support religious education (use)? 
Maybe it's possible to describe what happened here as status-based discrimination. 
But it seems equally, and maybe more, natural to say that the State's discrimination 
focused on what religious parents and schools do -- teach religion.283 
In response, the Chief Justice “acknowledge[s] the point,” but he says that there is 
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280 Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). 
281 Id. 
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no need to “examine it here.”284  Rather, “[i]t is enough in this case to conclude that 
strict scrutiny applies under Trinity Lutheran because Montana's no-aid provision 
discriminates based on religious status.”285 
 Why is the Chief Justice so insistent on the status/use distinction?  I suggest 
that there are two reasons.  First, as noted, Montana argued to the Court that if the 
focus is on use, there is a large leap from the government aid for playground 
resurfacing at issue in Trinity Lutheran, which Montana described as a non-religious 
use, to the government aid for religious use generally at issue in Espinoza.  The 
magnitude of that leap disappears if the focus is on status discrimination, which is 
common to both cases. 
 Second, there is the need to distinguish Locke, relied upon by Montana to 
defend its constitutional provision.  Davey, the scholarship applicant in Locke, “was 
denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to do -- use the funds to prepare 
for the ministry.”286  Apart from that “narrow” restriction, scholarships could be used 
at religious schools in Washington.  Their identity as religious schools was not 
disqualifying.  There was no status discrimination in Locke.  However, in Espinoza, 
as the Chief Justice explains, “Montana's Constitution does not zero in on any 
'essentially religious' course of instruction at . . . religious school[s].”287  Rather, “the 
no-aid provision bars all aid to a religious school 'simply because of what it is,' 
putting the school to a choice between being religious or receiving government 
benefits.”288 
 In a further effort to distinguish Espinoza from Locke, the Chief Justice turns 
to history.  He notes Locke's conclusion “that the propriety of state-supported clergy 
was a central subject of founding-era debates, and that most state constitutions from 
that era prohibited the expenditure of tax dollars to support the clergy,”289 thereby 
confirming the “'historic and substantial' state interest in not funding the training of 
clergy.”290  By contrast, “no comparable 'historic and substantial' tradition supports 
Montana's decision to disqualify religious schools from government aid.”291 
 Also, there were differences in the history of the anti-Catholic Blaine 
Amendment of 1875292 and its link to the Washington and Montana constitutional 
provisions.  Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that there was no connection between 
the Blaine Amendment and the Washington provision.293  That was not true of the 
Montana provision, prompting a pointed observation from Chief Justice Roberts: 
“the no-aid provisions of the 19th Century hardly evince a tradition that should 
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inform our understanding of the Free Exercise Clause.”294  To reinforce the 
repugnance of that tradition, the Chief Justice closes his opinion with a reminder that 
religious schools and the families whose children attend them “are 'member[s] of the 
community too,'“ and “their exclusion from the scholarship program here is 'odious 
to our Constitution' and 'cannot stand.'“295 
2.  Justice Breyer's Dissent 
 Justice Breyer wrote the primary dissent, joined in Part I by Justice Kagan.  In 
Trinity Lutheran, Justice Breyer had only concurred in the judgment, thereby 
distancing himself from the Chief's analysis in the majority opinion.  (Justice Kagan 
joined the Chief's opinion in full.)  In reasoning that presaged his dissent in Espinoza, 
Justice Breyer had focused on “the particular nature of the 'public benefit'“ at issue 
in Trinity Lutheran -- “a general program designed to secure or to improve the health 
and safety of children.”296  Finding no basis in such a program for treating religious 
schools differently, and acknowledging that the only reason advanced by the state 
was faith, he said:  
[I]t is that . . . fact that calls the Free Exercise Clause into play. We need not go 
further. Public benefits come in many shapes and sizes. I would leave the application 
of the Free Exercise Clause to other kinds of public benefits for another day.297 
 When that day comes in Espinoza, and the public benefit at issue is government 
scholarship aid available generally to religious schools, Justice Breyer sees a “shape 
and size” markedly different than the playground benefit at issue in Trinity Lutheran.  
Although the Chief Justice begins his Espinoza analysis with the concept he invoked 
at the beginning of his analysis in Trinity Lutheran -- the “play in the joints” between 
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause -- Justice Breyer sees this 
invocation as inconsistent with the Chief's analysis.  Justice Breyer believes that the 
majority opinion eliminates any space between the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses by holding “that the Free Exercise Clause forbids a State to draw any 
distinction between secular and religious uses of government aid to private schools 
that is not required by the Establishment Clause.”298  This holding, he fears, “risk[s] 
the kind of entanglement and conflict that the Religion Clauses are intended to 
prevent.”299 
As I have already noted, this concern for consequences is the core of Justice 
Breyer's church/state jurisprudence.300  Public officials making policy decisions 
about religious aid, and judges hearing First Amendment challenges to those 
decisions, must be able to make context-specific legal judgments sensitive to 
consequences.  Rigid rules declaring what the Establishment Clause prohibits, or the 
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Free Exercise Clause requires, make that exercise of legal judgment in the space 
between the Religion Clauses unnecessarily difficult.  As Justice Breyer puts it, 
echoing his Trinity Lutheran concurrence, “whether a particular state program falls 
within that space depends upon the nature of the aid at issue, considered in light of 
the Clauses' objectives.”301 
 To demonstrate his point, Justice Breyer compares the Espinoza state aid 
program to those reviewed in Locke and Trinity Lutheran: 
The program at issue here is strikingly similar to the program we upheld in Locke 
and importantly different from the program we found unconstitutional in Trinity 
Lutheran.  Like the state of Washington in Locke, Montana has chosen not to fund 
(at a distance) “an essentially religious endeavor” -- an education designed to 
“induce religious faith.”  That kind of program simply cannot be likened to 
Missouri's decision to exclude a church school from applying for a grant to resurface 
its playground.302 
He asks with some dismay: “What is it that leads the majority to conclude that 
funding the study of religion is more like paying to fix up a playground (Trinity 
Lutheran) than paying for a degree in theology (Locke)?”303 
 Justice Breyer understands that the answer to that question is the distinction 
that the Chief Justice draws between government aid programs that exclude religious 
institutions because of their status (Trinity Lutheran) and those that deny funding 
because of the religious use of the funds -- i.e., training for the ministry (Locke).  
Like Justice Gorsuch, Justice Breyer finds that distinction untenable.  As he points 
out, while “[i]t is true that Montana's no-aid provision broadly bars state aid to 
schools based on their religious affiliation[,] this case does not involve a claim of 
status-based discrimination.”304  Indeed, the religious schools of Montana are not 
even parties in the litigation.  Instead, the case was filed by “parents who assert that 
their free exercise rights were violated by the application of the no-aid provision to 
prevent them from using taxpayer-supported scholarships to attend schools of their 
choosing.”305  Thus, Justice Breyer says, “the question in this case -- unlike in Trinity 
Lutheran, boils down to what the schools would do with state support.  And the 
upshot is that here, as in Locke, we confront a state's decision not to fund the 
inculcation of religious truths.”306  That decision reflects a substantial establishment 
concern. 
 Turning to history, Justice Breyer reads it differently than Chief Justice 
Roberts. He acknowledges that it is almost impossible to “attribute to the founders 
any uniform understanding as to what constitutes, in the Constitution's phrase, 'an 
establishment of religion.'“307  But, he says, the historical record, at a minimum, 
makes clear that taxpayer funding of religious education created establishment 
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concerns that the state could consider without running afoul of the Free Exercise 
Clause.308  That disregard of the historical record by the majority, and the case law 
reflecting it, represents a dramatic turn in church/state law: 
If, for 250 years, we have drawn a line at forcing taxpayers to pay the salaries of 
those who teach their faith from the pulpit, I do not see how we can today require 
Montana to adopt a different view respecting those who teach it in the classroom.309 
Returning to his “play in the joints” theme, Justice Breyer concludes that “Montana's 
differential treatment of religious schools is constitutional.”310  He ends by invoking 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's observation about the scholarship aid at issue in Locke: “If 
any room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be here.”311 
C.  Riddles and Cautions 
 There is room for fair debate about whether the Supreme Court had to wade 
into its free exercise ruling at all.  Given the Montana Supreme Court's decision to 
invalidate the Montana scholarship program in its entirety, Justice Ginsburg says in 
dissent that the outcome reached by the state supreme court is one that Chief Justice 
Roberts says is permissible -- declining to fund all private schools, religious and non-
religious.312  So, according to Justice Ginsburg, there is no need for the Court to 
address the constitutionality of an alternative benefit program that distinguishes 
between secular and sectarian schools.313   
 Justice Sotomayor makes a similar point in her dissent, arguing that the Court, 
in addressing that alternative benefit program, answers a hypothetical question 
contrary to its Article III power.314  She also worries about remedy:  
[I]t is hard to tell what this Court wishes the state court to do.  There is no program 
from which petitioners are currently “exclu[ded],” so must the Montana Supreme 
Court order the State to recreate one?  Has this Court just announced its authority to 
require a state court to order a state legislature to fund religious exercise, overruling 
centuries of contrary precedent and historical practice?315 
 Chief Justice Roberts says that the dissenters have it all wrong when they focus 
                                                                                                     
308 Id. at *32. 
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on the outcome of the Montana Supreme Court decision.  That outcome, says the 
Chief, was the result of an error of federal law by the Montana Supreme Court at the 
beginning of its analysis.  He explains: 
When the Court was called upon to apply a state law no-aid provision to exclude 
religious schools from the program, it was obligated by the Federal Constitution to 
reject the invitation. Had the Court recognized that this was, indeed, “one of those 
cases” in which application of the no-aid provision “would violate the Free Exercise 
Clause,” . . . the Court would not have proceeded to find a violation of that provision. 
And, in the absence of such a state law violation, the Court would have had no basis 
for terminating the program. Because the elimination of the program flowed directly 
from the Montana Supreme Court's failure to follow the dictates of federal law, it 
cannot be defended as a neutral policy decision, or as resting on adequate and 
independent state law grounds.316 
As for Justice Sotomayor's concern about the remedy, he sees no problem: 
Justice Sotomayor worries that, in light of our decision, the Montana Supreme Court 
must “order the State to recreate” a scholarship program that “no longer exists.”  But 
it was the Montana Supreme Court that eliminated the program, in the decision 
below, which remains under review. Our reversal of that decision simply restores 
the status quo established by the Montana Legislature before the Court's error of 
federal law. We do not consider any alterations the Legislature may choose to make 
in the future.317 
Of course, the “status quo” referred to by the Chief Justice is the restoration by order 
of the United States Supreme Court of the scholarship program created by the 
Montana legislature.  That is no ordinary outcome. 
 Still, I think the Chief Justice makes a defensible argument that the Court 
appropriately decided the free exercise issue before it.  And I think Justice Ginsburg 
and Justice Sotomayor also make a defensible argument that there was an off-ramp 
available to the Supreme Court if it wanted to take it.  However, the majority had no 
interest in constitutional avoidance.  They saw in the decision of the Montana 
Supreme Court a free exercise issue that had been percolating for years, and they 
were not going to miss the opportunity to decide it.   
 And what exactly did the majority hold?  Chief Justice Roberts says this at the 
end of Part II of his opinion: 
A State need not subsidize private education. But once a State decides to do so, it 
cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious.318 
That phrase at the end -- “solely because they are religious” -- incorporates the 
Chief's status/use distinction.  That distinction in Espinoza was not new.  In the 
controversial footnote three in Trinity Lutheran,319 the Chief Justice referred to that 
distinction: “This case involves express discrimination based on religious identity 
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with respect to playground resurfacing.  We do not address religious uses of funding 
or other forms of discrimination.”320  And the majority adheres to that distinction in 
its review of the Montana Constitution's no-aid provision, which, as it happens, 
incorporates the same distinction.  The entire provision reads: 
The legislature, counties, cities, towns, school districts, and public corporations 
shall not make any direct or indirect appropriation or payment from any public fund 
or monies, or any grant of lands or other property for any sectarian purpose or to aid 
any church, school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or 
scientific institution, controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or 
denomination.321 
The provision contains two separate clauses, one barring the use of public funds for 
“any sectarian purpose,” i.e., religious use, and the other barring the use of public 
funds “to aid any . . . school . . .  controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, 
or denomination,” i.e., religious status.  The Supreme Court of Montana, however, 
held only that the scholarship program violated the religious-status clause of the no-
aid provision.322  Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts does not opine on the religious-use 
clause of the no-aid provision.323   
Indeed, the Chief remains notably circumspect about the meaning of the 
status/use distinction, despite goading by Montana in its advocacy and colleagues in 
their opinions (Justice Gorsuch in his concurrence and Justice Breyer in his dissent), 
with two exceptions.  As noted, in response to an argument of Montana, the Chief 
says: “Status-based discrimination remains status based even if one of its goals or 
effects is preventing religious organizations from putting aid to religious uses.”324  
And, after affirming that status-based discrimination is subject to the strictest 
scrutiny, he adds that “[n]one of this is meant to suggest that we agree with the 
Department that some lesser degree of scrutiny applies to discrimination against 
religious uses of government aid.”325  He will leave that issue for another day. 
 As one ponders the meaning of the Chief's statements about the status/use 
distinction, it is useful to remember what Justice Gorsuch said about it: “[A]ny 
jurisprudence grounded on a status-use distinction seems destined to yield more 
questions than answers.”326  For now, I think Justice Gorsuch is right.  As the lower 
courts face challenges to the many varieties of state no-aid provisions, both 
constitutional and statutory, that are sure to come, they will have to deal with the 
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applicability of the Court's status/use distinction knowing only that the Chief Justice 
attaches considerable significance to it.  Perhaps the Chief Justice anticipates that 
some public benefit programs, if they become available for religious uses, would 
violate the Establishment Clause even in its diminished state, thereby never falling 
in that space between what the Establishment Clause permits and the Free Exercise 
Clause requires.  In any event, the ultimate significance of the distinction will only 
become clear with future litigation. 
This much, however, is already clear in the wake of Espinoza -- the hand of 
those advocating in the courtrooms and in the legislative halls for government aid 
for religious schools has been greatly strengthened.  Whether one celebrates or 
laments that development, one should be clear-eyed about a phenomenon that 
worried Justice Breyer in his dissent -- the increased potential for religious discord 
when groups with varying political strengths begin to compete for scarce public 
resources to support religious schools.  Commenting on the proposition embraced by 
the majority -- that private choices by religious institutions and individuals to use 
public benefit programs eases Establishment Clause concerns -- Justice Breyer notes 
that those private choices do “not answer the question whether providing such aid is 
required,” as the majority holds.327  Moreover, those private choices do not resolve 
a host of other problems: 
Private choice cannot help the taxpayer who does not want to finance the 
propagation of religious beliefs, whether his own or someone else's.  It will not help 
religious minorities too few in number to support a school that teaches their beliefs.  
And it will not satisfy those whose religious beliefs preclude them from participating 
in a government-sponsored program.  Some or many of the persons who fit these 
descriptions may well feel ignored -- or worse -- when public funds are channeled 
to religious schools.  These feelings may, in turn, sow religiously inspired political 
conflict and division -- a risk that is considerably greater where states are required 
to include religious schools in programs like the one before us here.  And it is greater 
still where, as here, these programs benefit only a handful of a State's many religious 
denominations.328 
 Although the petitioners in Espinoza were members of the majority religion in 
this country, future applicants for government support for their schools might be any 
of the many denominations in our religiously diverse country.  Indeed, atheists could 
insist on support for their school if they had one.329  And the schools teaching some 
of these faiths might not meet state requirements for eligibility, which is exactly 
Justice Breyer's point.  The state may now have to make judgments about the 
eligibility of religious schools for state support, an unmistakable entanglement 
scenario.  Also, there will be members of the public offended at the notion that their 
taxpayer dollars will be used to support the religious tenets of a faith that they find 
deeply objectionable.  In this charged setting, it will be more important than ever that 
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we respect the religious differences in our society. 
 
  
